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"Trust and similar values, loyalty or truth telling ...

have real,

practical, economic value; they increase the efficiency of the system
,,1

I. INTRODUCTION

It turns out that Adam Smith was right.2 As communism and associated
command economies have come tumbling down, there is widespread
agreement that market economies are the means by which wealth is
produced.3 Given this point, what features are required in the building of a
I
KENNETH ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 23 (1974). "More than two decades ago,
Kenneth Arrow suggested that 'virtually every commercial transaction has within itself an element of trust'
and further, that'much of the economic backwardness in the world can be explained by the lack of mutual
confidence.'" William A. Galston, Trust-But Quantify, PUB. INTEREST, Winter 1996, at 129, 129.
2
See generally ADAM SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776).
By preferring the support of domestic to that of foreign industry, [the owner of capital]
intends only his own security; and by directing that industry in such a manner as its produce
may be of greatest value, he intends only his own gain, and he is in this, as in many other cases,
led by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part of his intention. Nor is it always
the worse for society that it was no part of it. By pursuing his own interest he frequently
promotes that of the society more effectively than when he really intends to promote it. I have
never known much good done by those who affected to trade for the public good.
Id. at 400.
3
See Galston, supra note 1, at 129; Munir Quddus et al., Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation
of Prosperity-AReview Article, 26 E. ECON. J. 87, 88 (2000) (Citing FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE
SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF PROSPERITY (1995) ("[Plraising neoclassical economists for
having convinced large parts of the global political and intellectual community that free markets provide
the most effective mechanism for bringing prosperity."). In his excellent book, AGAINST THE GODS: THE
REMARKABLE STORY OF RISK, Peter L. Bernstein describes the role that risk management has played in
the development of successful free markets. See PETER L. BERNSTEIN, AGAINST THE GODS: THE
REMARKABLE STORYOF RISK (1996).
By defining a rational process of risk-taking, [innovative risk management scholars have]
provided the missing ingredient that has propelled science and enterprise into the world of
speed, power, instant communication, and sophisticated finance that marks our own age.
Their discoveries about the nature of risk, and the art and science of choice, lie at the core of
our modern market economy that nations around the world are hastening to join. Given all
its problems and pitfalls, the free economy, with choice at its center, has brought humanity
unparalleled access to the good things of life.
Id. at 2. Bernstein continues:
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successful market economy? Standard answers to this query are predictable,
including "the removal of dead-weight government intervention," 4 "the

construction of key institutions-stock exchanges, banks, impartial legal
systems-as reliable frameworks for individual transactions,"5 and "the
circumscribed, but active, use of public power to correct 'market failures."' 6

While all of these factors are important, this article joins other recent
efforts7 in a widely multi-disciplinary literature that stresses the importance
of a less traditional, or at least less frequently treated, building block of
market economies: trust. Even amid a diversity of scholarly approaches, it is
universally agreed that trust is vital to the development and efficient
functioning of modern markets.' Indeed, the vulnerability that trust at once
[i]fwe had no liquid capital markets that enable savers to diversify their risks, if investors were
limited to owning just one stock (as they were in the early days of capitalism), the great
innovative enterprises that define our age-companies like Microsoft, Merck, DuPont, Alcoa,

Boeing, and McDonald's-might never have come into being. The capacity to manage risk,
and with it the appetite to take risk and make forward-looking choices, are key elements of the
energy that drives the economic system forward.
Id. at 3. This capacity to manage risk and the role that trust plays in this capacity is the primary focus of
this article.
4
5

Galston, supra note 1, at 129.
Id.

6

Id.
See, e.g., TRUST & RECIPROCITY: INTERDISCIPLINARY LESSONS FROM EXPERIMENTAL
RESEARCH (Elinor Ostrom &James Walker eds., 2003); RUSSELL HARDIN, TRUST & TRUSTWORTHINESS
7

(2002); TRUST IN SOCIETY (Karen S. Cook ed., 2001); TRUST & GOVERNANCE (Valerie Braithwaite &
Margaret Levi eds., 1998) [hereinafter BRAITHWAITE, GOVERNANCE]; ADAM B. SELIGMAN, THE PROBLEM
OF TRUST (1997); TRUST IN ORGANIZATIONS: FRONTIERS OF THEORYAND RESEARCH (Roderick M.
Kramer & Tom R. Tyler eds., 1996); BARBARA A. MISZTAL, TRUST IN MODERN SOCIETIES (1996);
FUKUYAMA, supra note 3; R. William Ide III & Douglas H. Yarn, PublicIndependent Fact-Finding:A TrustGenerating Institutionfor an Age of CorporateIllegitimacy and Public Mistrust, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1113 (2003);
Avner Ben-Ner & Louis Putterman, Trusting and Trsnvorthiness,81 B.U. L. REV. 523 (2001); Margaret
M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness,and the BehavioralFoundationsof CorporateLaw, 149 U. PA.
L. REV. 1735 (2001); Larry E. Ribstein, Law v. Trust, 81 B.U. L. REV. 553 (2001); Manuel Beccerra & Anil
K Gupta, Trust Within the Organization:Integratingthe Trust Literaturewith Agency Theory and Transaction Cost
Economics, 23 PUB. ADMIN. Q. 177 (1999); Mick Moore, Truth, Trust and Market Transactions,36 J. OF
DEVELOPMENTAL STUD. 74 (1999); ChristopherW. Morris, What is This Thing Called "Reputation"?,9 BUS.
ETHICS Q. 87 (1999); Rachel Croson & Nancy Buchan, Gender and Culture: InternationalExperimental
Evidencefrom Trust Games, 89 THE AM. ECON. REV. 386 (1999); Bart Nooteboom et al., Effects of Trust and
Governanceon Relational Risk, 40 ACAD. OF MGMT.J. 308 (1997); Todd H. Chiles &John F. McMackin,
Integrating Variable Risk Preferences, Trust, and Transaction Cost Economics, 21 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 73
(1996); Bernd Lahno, Trust, Reputation, and Exit in Exchange Relationships, 39 THEJ. OF CONFLICT RESOL.
495 (1995).
8
See, e.g., Ralph Chami & Connel Fullenkamp, Trust and Efficiency, 26 BANIUNG & FIN. 1785
(2002); Giancarlo Spagnolo, Social Relations and Cooperationin Organizations, 38J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG.
1 (1999); RoderickM. Kramer, Trust andDistrust in Organizations:Emerging Perspectives, EnduringQuestions,
50 ANN. REV. OF PSYCHOL. 569 (1999); Ronald C. Nyhan & Herbert A. Marlowe, Jr., Development and
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requires and attempts to mitigate is necessary in order for specialization in
production, capital accumulation, and social exchange to take place. 9 In
recent times, however, we have witnessed an avalanche of corporate
wrongdoing or incompetence that has led to widespread "cris[es] of social
legitimacy and [a] loss of public trust."'" High profile cases of shareholder
abuse, gutted pension funds, and massive job loss have hung a dark cloud
over the markets as a whole, bringing about a startling downturn and
exacerbating an economic recession.11 These scandals represent a failure of
not only laws and regulations, but of corporate leadership and corporate
counsel. 2 "Public confidence in large corporations, their executives and
financial officers has reached an all-time low.'

13

In response, lawmakers,

4

Psychometric Properties of the Organizational Trust Inventory, 21 EVAL. REV. 614 (1997); Richard Butler, A
TransactionalApproachto OrganizingEfficiency: PerspectivesfromMarkets, Hierarchies,andCollectives, 15 ADMIN.
& SOC. 323 (1983); Hwee Hoon Tan & Christy S. F. Tan, Toward the Differentiation of Trust in Supervisor
and Trust in Organization,GENETIC, Soc. & GEN. PSYCHOL., May 2000, at 241. Even when proposing
appropriate reactions to well-defined market failures, current public law scholarship eschews established
solutions to collective action problems, see generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE
ACTION: PUBLIC GOALS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965), in favor of more robust models built
upon notions of trust. See Dan M. Kahan, Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 81 B.U. L. REV. 333, 333-34
(2001) ("Whereas the conventional model of collective action counsels the creation of appropriate external
incentives, a new, behaviorally realistic model suggests the importance of promoting trust.").
9
See Galston, supra note 1, at 129.
[T]he modem market economy rests on associations of production and exchange that extend
beyond the family or village. This requires, in turn, trust, widely distributed. Societies
endowed with broad-based trust enjoy a form of "social capital" that contributes at least as
much to their success in modern economic competition as do the factor endowments stressed
by traditional economic analysis.
Id.
10
Ide & Yarn, supra note 7, at 1114. The Enron and WorldCom debacles, along with the
fraudulent auditing practices of Arthur Andersen, represent particularly notable examples, although there
are many more. Id. The recent acceleration of these incidents is attributed by some to the media's
appetite for the intrigue of corporate fraud and the technological ability to widely distribute such
information at the blink of an eye. Id. at 1115-16.
1
Note, The Good, theBad, and Their Corporate Codes of Ethics: Enron, Sarbanes-O.xey, and the
Problems with Legislating Good Behavior, 116 HARV.L. REV. 2123, 2123 (2003) [hereinafter The Good, the
Bad] ("Allegations of accounting fraud and corporate misdeeds at high-profile companies such as Enron,
WorldCom, Tyco International, and Adelphia Communications, along with five of the ten largest
bankruptcies in United States history, shook investor confidence in 2001 and 2002 and gave rise to
widespread calls for the reform of corporate diligence, ethics, and controls."). Some commentators seem
to see the abuses as symptomatic of the market downturn, that is, it is because of the downturn that such
abuses are being revealed. See generally Randall S. Thomas, Should Directors Reduce Executive Pay?, 54
HASTINGS L.J. 437,437 (2003); Jerry W. Markham, Super Regulator: A ComparativeAnalysis of Securities and
Derivatives Regulation in the United States, The United Kingdom, andJapan, 28 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 319, 400
n.421 (2003).
12
See The Good, the Bad, supra note 11, at 2123.
13
See MICHAEL B. BIXBY, THE ENRON/ARTHUR ANDERSEN DEBACLE: A CASE STUDY AND
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regulators, 15 and private institutions 6 have all scrambled to restore public
trust in corporate governance and to mitigate the effects that the loss of trust
has had on markets worldwide.
Crisis in corporate behavior is not novel. 17 The list of major corporations
that have suffered financial collapse is a lengthy one; Polaroid, Penn Central,
Pan Am, TWA, Kidder Peabody and Drexel Burnham, just to name a few.
The thrift industry and the commercial banking industry have both come
apart at the seams at various times in our history. Most recently, huge
chunks of market value evaporated as the ethereal dot-coin industry was
decimated. So what was it about the downfall ofEnron, the high-tech energy

LEGAL IMPLICATIONS 2 (2003). "A poll conducted even before the WorldCom disclosures showed that

57% of Americans said they do not trust corporate executives or brokerage firms to give them honest
information, and the number is probably higher now." Id. (citing Americans Distrust Institutions in Poll,
WALL ST. J.,Jun. 13, 2002, at A4.) (emphasis added).
14
See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Public Law 107-204, S 116 Stat. 745, codified at 15
U.S.C. 7201, et seq. (2002). For recent analysis of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, see Thomas Wardell, The
Current State ofPlay Under the Sarbanes-OxleyAct of 2002, 28 N. CAROLINAJ. OF INT'L L. & COM. REG. 935
(2003); The Good, the Bad, supra note 11; Brian Kim, Sarbanes-OxleyAct, 40 HARV.J. ON LEGIS. 235 (2003);
Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Reinvention of CorporateGovernance?, 48 VILL. L. REV.
1189 (2003); William S. Duffey, Jr., CorporateFraud and Accountability: A Primer on Sarbanes-OxleyAct of
2002, 54 S.C. L. REV. 405 (2002). For representative comments regarding the Act on the congressional
floor, see 148 Cong. Rec. H5472-73 (daily ed.July 25, 2002) (statement of Rep. Jackson-Lee); 148 Cong.
Rec. H5462 (daily ed.July 25, 2002) (statement of Rep. Oxley); 148 Cong. Rec. H5462-79 (daily ed.July
25, 2002) (statements by numerous representatives). See also Press Release, White House, President Bush
Signs Corporate Corruption Bill (July 30, 2002), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/
07020020730.html.
15
For the SEC disclosure requirements, see Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 68 Fed. Reg. 5110, 5117-20 (Jan. 31,2003) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 228-29,
249).
16
SeeJames H. Cheek, III et al., Preliminary Report of the American Bar Association Task Force
on Corporate Responsibility 3-4 (July 16, 2002), http://vww.abanet.org/buslaw/corporateresponsibility/
preliminaryreport.pdf; AFL-CIO, Corporate Accountability and the Crisis of Confidence in American
Business (Aug. 6, 2002), at http://www.aflcio.org/aboutaflcio/ecouncil/ec0806e2002.cfm; Corporate
Governance Rule Proposals Reflecting Recommendations from the NYSE Corporate and Listing
Standards Committee as Approved by the NYSE Board of Directors, August 1, 2002, S 303A.9-.10
(codified at Section 303A of the NYSE Listed Company Manual), http://www.nyse.com/pdfs/corp_
govpro~b.pdf; Form 19b-4 Proposed Rule Change by National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.
(Jan. 15, 2003), http://www.nasdaq.com.about/SR-NASD-2002-139-Amendmentl.pdf, AAAIndependent
Fact-Finding Services: Preserving Public Trust and Confidence, http://www.adr.org/upload/LIVESITE/
focusArea/Fact-Finding/75-282_IFFSS_mech.pdf
17
In recent years, there has been the price-fixing crisis in the 1960s electrical equipment industry,
the 1970s foreign payments crisis, the 1980s insider trading crisis, and the 1980s defense procurement
fraud crisis. See The Good, the Bad, supra note 11, at 2124. For a look at responses to these crises in the
form of corporate codes of conduct, see Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, Minimizing Corporate
Civil and Criminal Liability:A Second Look at CorporateCodes of Conduct, 78 GEO. L.J. 1559, 1562, 1582-98
(1990).
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conglomerate, as well as other corporate scandals in the same timeframe, is
that was different? What was it about Enron that caused a collective shiver
down to our national, in fact international, bones?
This article will begin by proposing a manner in which the Enron
debacle was very different and by fathoming the depths of concern over the
future of our financial markets that were brought about by this difference.
Next, in preparation for support of a trust generating mechanism that has
been designed to address these dire circumstances, this article will offer a
very brief taxonomy of trust with discussion as to how this taxonomy
highlights specific aspects of trust important to the context of problems
considered here. For any study of trust, context is very important, 19 and to
be clear, the focus of this article is trust as a component of the relationship
that shareholders have with corporations and corporate management.
However, much of the insight is directly applicable to relationships between
corporate management and other stakeholders.
This article continues with a consideration of the theoretical relationship
between trust and risk. Employing a game theoretic framework known as
the "trust game" or the "reliance game," the discussion illustrates that the
critical focal point of the aftermath of crisis in corporate governance is the
dearth of shareholder reliance. Various strategies for managing this form of
relational risk are appraised.
One means of addressing relational risk, and specifically the lack of
shareholder reliance, is the notion of public independentfact-finding (PIFF),
which has recently been proposed in the literature and which has taken shape
in the offerings ofa few providers of dispute resolution services. This article
provides an overview of PIFF as a trust-generating mechanism and looks
more closely at the specific features of services offered by one private
institution, the American Arbitration Association (AAA).
Finally, this article concludes that the environment of corporate
governance is indeed fundamentally different in the post-Enron world and
that traditional legal and regulatory responses seen in the context of previous

11

Including Adeiphia, Arthur Andersen, Dynergy, Global Crossing, Tyco, Wo"uiCuic,,

adu

Xerox. See Roger C. Cramton, Enron and the CorporateLawyer: A Primer on Legal and Ethical Issues, 58 BUS.
LAW. 143, 144 (2002) ("The Enron affair and the flood of other recent corporate scandals (e.g., Adelphia,
Arthur Andersen ....Dynergy, Global Crossing, Tyco, WorldCom, Xerox) have led to a loss of investor
and public confidence in the integrity of the securities and other markets that make American capitalism

work-").
19

Lawrence Lessig, Preface to a Conference on Trust, 81 B.U. L. REV. 329, 332 (2001) ("The point

is that the value of trust for a particular purpose is obviously, and plainly, contingent upon a pile of factors
that cannot be known in the abstract. How one will substitute for the other is something we can only
know in particular cases."); TRUST& RECIPROCITY: INTERDISCIPLINARYLESSONS FROM EXPERIMENTAL

RESEARCH, supra note 7, at 14 ("Trust appears to be a complex concept strongly affected by context.").
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corporate crises may not be effective at restoring order. PIFF, while possibly
in need of fine-tuning and wanting for the benefits of further institutionalization, offers one hope of shoring up the shortfalls of these traditional
approaches. It does so by relying upon a free market for trust and reputation
and by avoiding the inefficiencies virtually always incumbent in govern-

mental intervention.
II. THE Loss OF TRUST
Crisis in corporate governance and the inevitable resulting loss of trust
are not new phenomena to our economic system.20 However, the tone of the
marketplace and the character of investor confidence have been quite
different since the disintegration ofEnron, the former stock market star with
its sights set on becoming the world's leading energy firm.2 ' In myriad
previous cases of corporate wrongdoing, there have been substantial losses
suffered by shareholders as well as employees. What was it that prompted
the public outcry, the unprecedented number of Congressional investigations, 22 and the regulatory tightening that we witnessed post-Enron? No
a lot from careful study of the circumstances that led
doubt, we have learned
to Enron's demise, 23 but one of the most salient questions involves what
made these circumstances different.

20

21

See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
See The Amazing DisintegratingFirm, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 6, 2001, http://www.economist

.con/business/PrinterFriendly.cfm?Story_lD=896844 [hereinafter The Amazing Disintegrating Firm].
Enron filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy on December 2nd. See also Bixoy, supra note 13, at 1.
In early 2001 Enron Corporation was listed #5 on the list of"Fortune 500" corporations (just
behind Ford Motor Company and ahead of General Electric) based on its revenue. In a little
over 15 years Enron had grown from a modest Houston gas pipeline company into a $100
billion-a-year business. Its stock was selling in excess of $80 per share, giving the company a
total equity of some $60 billion. Enron owned power companies and pipelines around the
world, and had pioneered the energy trading business.
Id.
2
"At least ten Congressional committees and several government agencies, including a Justice
Department criminal task force" have investigated Enron. BDxBY, supra note 13, at 1.
23
See, e.g., Mark H. Lang, InternationalAccounting in Light of Enron:Evidencefrom EmpiricalResearch,
28 N.C. J. INT'L. L. & CoM. REG. 953 (2003); The Good, the Bad, supra note 11; Erica Beecher-Monas,
CorporateGovernance in the Wake of Enron:An Examinationof the Audit Committee Solution to Corporate Fraud,
55 ADMIN. L. REV. 357 (2003); Marianne M. Jennings, A Primeron Enron: Lessonsfrom a Perfect Storm of
Financial Reporting, Corporate Governance and Ethical Culture Failures, 39 CAL. W. L. REv. 163 (2003)
[hereinafter Jennings, Perfect Storm I]; Robert B. Thompson, CorporateGovernance After Enron, 40 HOUS.
L. REV. 99 (2003); Nancy B. Rapoport, Enron, Titanic, and the Perfect Storm, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1373
(2002) [hereinafter Rapoport, Perfect Storm II].
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A central premise of the arguments made in this article is that the Enron
catastrophe was different because it demonstrated, in one fell swoop, the
frailty of virtually all of the safeguards that investors have placed their faith
in for decades. 24 The relationship of shareholders with corporate management is one ofvirtually pure agency.2t Shareholders have very little influence
over how capital is deployed by the company and have no opportunity for
direct oversight. As a result, the trust that investors place in the companies
in which they invest rests on the foundations of a small number of
institutional mechanisms that act as "gatekeepers" for the protection of their
interests. In the case of Enron, these mechanisms- including corporate
governance and directors' oversight, public accounting and auditing firms,
the standards of GAAP accounting, and assessments by brokerage firm
analysts-all failed at the same instant, in a colossal "perfect storm" ;26 a
breach of shareholder trust that brought the house of cards that27was Enron
tumbling down and taking the life savings of thousands with it.
A. CorporateGovernance & the Board of Directors
Standards of corporate governance are designed "to provide a mechanism
by which the express or implied promises of the company's management are
monitored and enforced." 2' Because shareholders do not enjoy the capacity
of conducting this monitoring for themselves, they formally delegate this
authority to the board of directors. Conflicts of interest can certainly arise
where directors have close relationships with management and are suborned
to neglect their responsibilities to shareholders in favor of management

24

PeterJ. Wallison, The Significance ofEnron, Le Centre Francais sur les Etats-Unis, May 15,2002,

http://www.aei.org/publications/publD. 14874/pubdetail.asp ("]Tlhe Enron collapse called into question
the most fundamental beliefs of investors in the United States about how their interests were protected.").
25
See id., http://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.14874/pub detail.asp.
It is important to keep in mind that investors in public companies have relatively little control
over how their funds are used by the company's management. Investors' willingness to
purchase equity shares depends on a belief that management will hold to explicit or implicit
promises about how the company will be operated, and in the most general sense this promise
is that the company will be operated for the benefit of the shareholders and not the
management.
Id., http://www.aei.org/publications/publD.14874/pub detail.asp
26
Laura Goldberg, Did No Wrong, Skilling Says: Defends His Role in Enron Fall, Hous. CHRON.,
Jan. 17, 2002, http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA/story.hts/special/enron/dec0l/1183520 ("[Former Enron
CEO Jeffrey] Skilling offered a hypothesis for what brought Enron down, calling it a 'perfect storm' of
events."). See also Jennings, Perfect Storm I, supra note 23; Rapoport, Perfect Storm II, supra note 23.
27
See generally Daniel Kadlec et al., Power Failure:As Enron Crashes,Angry Workers and Shareholders
Ask, "/here Were the Finn's Directors?The Regulators? The Stock Analysts?, TIME, Dec. 10, 2001, at 68.
Wallison, supra note 24.
28
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interests. 2' So, one might imagine that Enron's board was loaded with
insiders. Not so. In fact, Enron's directors have been widely characterized
as a "model," with vast experience and only two, out of 17, insiders. 30 A
"model" board, "as good as it gets," but nevertheless a failed institution of
shareholder trust and confidence.
B. PublicAccounting & Auditing Firms
In the rare circumstance that a board of directors, particularly a board as
strong as the one that provided oversight and guidance for Enron
management, failed in its obligations to shareholders, public accounting and
auditing firms would surely take up the slack and intervene with vigilance to
protect investor interests. In fact, the Securities Act of 193331 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934,32 created requirements for auditor independence and placed auditors in the position of acting as gatekeepers 33 for the
markets. Indeed, the present litigation climate is one in which accounting
and auditing firms have been found liable when erroneous financial reports
have misled investors. 34 Combined with the incentives to protect their

29

Id. ("The possibility that directors may be suborned to neglect their duty is most likely of

course in cases where the directors are the management: where the board is what is known as an "inside
board" or where the directors are beholden to management through contractual or financial
relationships.").
30
SeeJennings,Perfect Storm I, supra note 23, at 197 ("Enron's Board was a model judging by the
standards of those who urge strong corporate governance."); Wallison, supra note 24 ("If any board would
have been expected to apprehend, understand and stop illegal, unethical or manipulative actions by
management, it would have been this board.... One might say this was as good a board as any company
could assemble in the United States, and the audit committee was-relative to the experience of other
audit committees-much better than most."). Only Kenneth Lay, Chairman, and Jeffrey Skilling, CEO
prior to his August 2001 departure, were insiders on the board. The audit committee was made up of six
independent members, including two who were former senior government officials in the United States
and the United Kingdom, and a chairman, Robert K.Jaedicke, who was Professor Emeritus ofAccounting
and the former Dean of the Stanford Business School. Id.

31

Pub. L. No. 63-22, 5 5, 48 Stat. 64,77-78 (1933) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.

55 77(a)-

(aa), 77(e) (2000)).

32

Pub. L. No. 73-290, SS 4, 12-13, 19, 14 Stat. 881, 885, 892-95, 898-99 (1934) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. SS 78(a)-78(mm), 78(d), 78(1), 78(m), 78(s) (2000)).
33
For discussions of the gatekeeper role, see generally Stephen Choi, Market Lessons for
Gatekeepers, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 916, 946 (1998); John C. Coffee, Jr., UnderstandingEnron: 'It's About the
Gatekeepers,Stupid', 57 Bus. LAW. 1403, 1404-05 (2002); Reinier Kraakman, CorporateLiability Strategiesand
the Costs of Legal Controls, 93 YALE L.J. 857, 888-96 (1984).
34
Wallison, supra note 24.
In a litigious society such as the United States, accountants have been required to pay huge
judgments for mistakes or inattentiveness in attesting to the financial statements of their
clients. Auditors can be sued directly by shareholders who bought or sold shares in reliance
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reputations within the marketplace, one would think that a prominent firm
with the stature of Arthur Andersen would not allow the misleading financial
results reported by Enron to be made public. Andersen, however, did not
intervene, instead choosing complicity in an attempt to cover up the
misreporting, 35 and "call[ing] into question investors' faith in the accounting
profession generally to protect them against the depredations of manage36

ment."

C. GAAP Accounting
The Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) are a set of
standards for financial reporting in the United States. 37 "GAAP is [sic]
essential to the efficient functioning of the economy because decisions
concerning resource allocations rely heavily on credible, concise, and
understandable financial reporting."38 The experts that revise and update
GAAP, the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), and the SEC have
for a very long time contended that GAAP, as practiced in the United States,
represented the most highly developed system of accounting available. 39 "For
years, investors had no reason to doubt this." 4° Unfortunately, GAAP also
failed to protect the investors who had for so long placed their confidence in
the complex set of rules. In fact, Enron's accounting practices "fell within

on misleading or false financial reports that the auditor certified, even if they were not
complicit in the company's manipulative action. Simple negligence is enough to result in
liability.
ld.
35
See Jerry W. Markham, Accountants Make Miserable Policemen: Rethinking the Federal Securities
Laws, 28 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 725, 777 (2003) ("Arthur Andersen was.., destroyed in the
Enron scandal after being convicted of obstruction ofjustice in connection with its handling of Enron
documents.") (citing Ken Brown & lanthe Jeanne Dugan, Sad Account: Andersen's Fallfrom Grace is a Tale
of Greed and Miscues, WALL ST.J., June 7, 2002, at Al.).
36
Wallison, supra note 24.
37
Steven A. Fisher, Measuring the Evolution ofGenerallyAcceptedAccounting Principles, 14 THEJ. OF
APPLIED Bus. REs. 105, 105 (1998).
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) guide corporate financial reporting in the
United States. GAAP consists of conventions, rules, and procedures necessary to define
accepted accounting practice at a particular time. These principles have gained substantial
support either through the actions of authoritative rule-making bodies or through general
acceptance of a practice over time because of its universal application by the accounting
profession.
Id.
38

Id.

39

Wallison, supra note 24.

40

Id.
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the letter of the rules, but [still] resulted in highly misleading financial
statements." 41 Yet another pillar of trust had let investors down.
D. Brokerage Firm Analysts
Investors must have been suspicious all along about the independence of
advice offered by analysts employed by brokerage houses. Right? How
could they not have realized that most brokerage houses, and their analyst
employees, are in the business of selling securities to investors? Nonetheless,
in a dramatic playing out of the old advertising slogan "When E.F. Hutton
talks, people listen," 42 many investors did listen to analyst recommendations
and "rode [Enron] all the way down to almost zero." 43 Now, there is
increasing evidence that these analysts, these sophisticated experts that
investors have long relied upon, continued to recommend buying the stocks
of Enron and other similar companies even when they knew that they were
vastly overvalued or even worthless. 4 One last vestige of investor trust had
been violated.
The failure of Enron's model board resulted in a loss of investor
confidence in corporate governance generally.45 Andersen's failure as the

41

Id. See also BIXBY, supra note 13.

Under accounting rules, when an energy trading company trades electricity or gas, it can count
as revenues the whole amount of every transaction rather than simply the profit or loss, as a
brokerage firm does. That is how Enron, a relative newcomer to the trading of commodities
and related financial instruments, was able to produce $101 billion of revenue in 2000, up from
$40 billion in 1999.
Id. (citation omitted);Joshua Ronen, Post-EnronReform: FinancialStatement Insurance, andGAAP Re-visited,
8 STAN.J.L. Bus. & FIN. 39, 60 (2002) (arguing that Andersen accepted principles that "while conforming
to the letter of the rules, violated the basic objectives of GAAP accounting.").
42
For a case in which a federaljudge disallowed suits based upon nothing more than reliance on
this advertising slogan, see Zerman v. Ball, 735 F.2d 15, 20-21 (2d Cir. 1984).
43
Wallison, supra note 24.
44
See Markham, supra note 35, at 728 ("Analysts were accused of being touts, rather than
conductors of objective examinations of company prospects."); William H. Widen, Enron at the Margin,
58 Bus. LAW. 961,962 n.ll (2003) (citing Coffee, supra note 33, at 1417).
Professor Coffee is right to identify a massive failing of traditional third-party gatekeepers,
such as accountants, investment analysts, and rating agencies, to alert the investment
community to the Enron fraud. Such afailurecan be expected when technical compliance with rules
becomes a substituteforgeneralethical behavior. This debate will be played out in discussions over
whether accounting should shift its emphasis from technical compliance to a general policy
of fair disclosure.
Id. (emphasis added); Christopher C. Faille, Book Review: Enron andBeyond: TechnicalAnalysis ofAccounting,
Corporate Governance, and Securities Issues, FED. LAW., May, 2003, at 59, 59 ("[B]right analysts kept
recommending Enron's stock even as it approached and fell over the cliff of insolvency.").
45
Wallison, supra note 24.
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gatekeeper for publicly reported financial results deepened distrust. GAAP
accounting had been manipulated by clever management. Brokerage
analysts, falsely perceived as objective overseers of financial performance, had
whipped up hysteria over Enron stock that was designed for their own profit
rather than grounded in accurate analysis, and which many investors found
hard to resist. Combine these institutional failures with the culture at Enron
that encouraged aggressive risk-taking and the pursuit of short-term profits,46
and the result was disastrous.
As we all know from personal experience, once lost, trust is harder to
regain. The simultaneous failure ofvarious traditional oversight mechanisms
has therefore created an urgent need for new trust-generating mechanisms.
One possibility, PIFF, which attempts to address the complexity of roles in
the shareholder-management relationship,47 will be considered in what
follows. Before turning to proposed means for the restoration of trust,
however, this article will provide a brief taxonomy of trust and will propose
a working definition of trust that will ground the analysis moving forward.
II.

DEFINING TRUST

What is trust? Researchers have proffered a wide variety of definitions
and subtleties of meaning, making it challenging to compare any specific
piece of research to others.4 8 As Voltaire admonished, "If you wish to
converse with me, define your terms." 49 This section takes heed ofVoltaire's
warning by providing one framework for the examination of trust. To begin,
a number of ways in which one may operationalize trust, based on
deterrence, a subjective calculus, relationships, or institutions, are explored.
Next, possibly armed with a better understanding ofwhat trust is, this section
examines what trust is explicitly not, paying particular attention to a contrast

between law and trust and a posited failure ofregulatory rule-based responses

46
47

Rapoport, Perfect Storm II, supra note 23, at 1379.
Trust is predicated on fundamental differences between party roles and thereby "emerges as
a function of negotiation." Adam B. Seligman, Role Complexity, Risk, and the Emergence of Trust, 81 B.U.
L. REV. 619, 627 (2001). The function of corporate governance in mitigating differences between
shareholder goals and management goals offers a particularly apropos example of the role of agency in the
development of trust. As discussed above, trust is particularly important in this context because of the
difficulty that individual shareholders face in monitoring management activities.
48
See D. Harrison McKnight & Norman L. Chervany, The Meanings of Trust,
http://www.misrc.umn.edu/workingpapers/fullpapers/1996/9604_040100.pdf (last revised Apr. 1, 2000).
49
See Michael Murphy, ManagingYourPublic Risk, at http://www.cadmus.ca/newsjun99.htm (last
visited Aug. 19, 2003) ("Our assumptions define us. They limit us. They can also kill people. Ambiguity
is another major source of risk. Tasks, properly defined, are already half done. The picture in your head
must be the same as those in the heads of others!").
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to the loss of trust. Finally, this section underscores the critical importance
of trust and describes the important role that reputation plays to generalize
the expectations that allow trust to function in society as a lubricant for
cooperative behavior.
A. Typologies of Trust
The study of trust is a highly multidisciplinary enterprise with exceedingly divergent meanings and understandings.5 ° Even so, confident expectations" regarding the behavior of others and a willingness to make oneself
vulnerable5 2 seem to be features of most definitions of trust.53 A definition
based on these common elements, and the working definition employed by
this article, is as follows: [t]rust is a psychological state comprising the
intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the
intentions or behavior of another.54 Within the general boundaries of this
definition, different forms of trust have been proposed.55 A closer examination of some of these forms will facilitate understanding of roles that trust
may play generally and will help to operationalize trust in the context of the
arguments presented in this article.
1. DETERRENCE BASED
When costly sanctions, such as contract-based damages or legal penalties,
are employed to deter a breach of promised obligation, then such deterrence

50
See Francis Fukuyama, Differing DisciplinaryPerspectives on the Origins of Trust, 81 B.U. L. REV.
479 (2001); Gregory A. Bigley & Jone L. Pearce, Strainingfor Shared Meaning in Organizational Science:
Problems of Trust and Distrust,23 AcAD. oF MGMT. REV. 405, 405 (1998). For a very detailed attempt at
constructing a classification scheme for types of trust, see McKnight & Chervany, supra note 48.
51

See Russell Hardin, Gaming Trust, in TRUST & RECIPROCITY: INTERDISCIPLINARY LESSONS

FROM EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH, supra note 7, at 81 [hereinafter Hardin, Gaming Trust] ("In virtually all
theories and accounts of trust, there is an element of expectations.").
52
See generally Roger C. Mayer et al., An Integrative Model of OrganizationalTrust, 20 ACAD. OF
MGMT. REv. 709 (1995).

53
See Denise M. Rousseau et al., Not So Different After All: A Cross-Discipline View of Trust, 23
ACAD. OF MGMT. REv. 393, 394 (1998) [hereinafter Rousseau, Not So Different] (citing RoyJ. Lewicki
et al., Trust and Distrust: New Relationships and Realities, 23 ACAD. OF MGMT. REv. 438 (1998)); Aneil K.
Mishra & Gretchen M. Spreitzer, Explaining How Survivors Respond to Downsizing: The Roles of Trust,
Empowerment,Justice,and Work Redesign, 23 ACAD. OF MGMT. REv. 567 (1998); Rajeev Bhattacharya et al.,
A Formal Model of Trust Based on Outcomes, 23 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 459 (1998); Roger C. Mayer et al.,
An IntegrativeModel of OrganizationalTrust, 20 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 709 (1995).
s4
Rousseau, supra note 53, at 395. Note that there is also wide agreement that risk is essential
for trust to arise. Id.
5
See id. at 398.
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may be said to be a source of trust, at least to the extent that the cost of the
sanctions exceed the perceived benefit of opportunistic behavior.56
Ultimately, however, this begs the question of whether the deterrence
actually produces trust or, if instead, the sanctions simply substitute for trust.
Deterrence-based trust may not really be trust at all.57
2.

CALCULUS BASED

Calculus-based trust derives from a subjective accounting in which the
rational trustor 58 tallies the expected benefits to be gained by interacting with
a trustee and weighs them against risk-adjusted losses that might ensue from
a breach of trust on the part of the trustee or from foregoing the interaction
entirely. This cost-benefit analysis59 proceeds in the spirit of standard
expected utility theory that has found application in virtually all disciplines
that deal with behavior. 6' As such, the expectancies related to trustee
56
"Deterrence-based trust emphasizes utilitarian considerations that enable one party to believe
that another will be trustworthy, because the costly sanctions in place for breach of trust exceeds any
potential benefits from opportunistic behavior." Id. See generally Peter Smith Ring & Andrew H. Van de
Ven, Developmental Process of Cooperative InterorganizationalRelationships, 19 ACAD. OF MGMT. REV. 90
(1994); Peter Smith Ring & Andrew H. Van de Ven, Structuring Cooperative Relationships Between
Organizations, 13 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 483 (1992); Debra L. Shapiro et al., Business on a Handshake, 8
NEGOTIATION J. 365 (1992).
57
Rousseau, supra note 53, at 399 ("[Tlrust is not a control mechanism but a substitute for
control .... Control comes into play only when adequate trust is not present."); Sim B. Sitkin & Nancy
L. Roth, Explaining the Limited Effectiveness of Legalistic Remediesfor Trust/Distrust,3 ORGANIZATIONAL SCI.
367, 369 (1993). This distinction will be important to the argument that trust can serve a function that
legalistic remedies cannot. See infra notes 72, 83 and accompanying text.
58
Such an economically minded person "has three properties. (a) He is completely informed.
(b) He is infinitely sensitive. (c) He is rational." Ward Edwards, The Theory of Decision Making, 51
PSYCHOL. BULL. 380, 381 (1954). "The crucial fact about economic man is that he is rational. This
means two things: He can weakly order the states into which he can get, and he makes his choices so as
to maximize something." Id.
59
Tamar Fankel & Wendy Gordon, Introduction: Trust Relationships, 81 B.U. L. REV. 321, 323
(2001).
60
See, e.g., PAUL ANAND, FOUNDATIONS OF RATIONAL CHOICE UNDER RISK 131 (1993)

("There can be few theories that would appear to be so important in so many disciplines."); JANET
LANDMAN, REGRET: THE PERSISTENCE OF THE POSSIBLE 117 (1993) ("By now utilitarian decision theory
has achieved canonical status."); R.J. Hemstein, Rational Choice Theory: Necessary but Not Sufficient, 45 AM.
PSYCHOL. 356, 356 (1990) ("Not just economics, but all the disciplines dealing with behavior, from
political philosophy to behavioral biology, rely increasingly on the idea that human and other organisms
tend to maximize utility, as formalized in modern economic theory .... The scattered dissenters to the
theory are often viewed asjust that-scattered and mere dissenters to an orthodoxy almost as entrenched
as a religious dogma."); John C. Hershey &Jonathon Baron, ClinicalReasoning and Cognitive Processes, 7
MED. DECISION MAKING 203,203 (1987) (" [Expected utility theory] is generally accepted, having formed
the basis in the last forty years for virtually all theoretical and applied research in economics, finance,
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behavior can certainly arise from the existence of deterrence but, importantly
to the main thesis of this article, such calculus-based trust can also be
generated "because of credible information regarding the intentions or
competence of another."6 One source of such credible information is
independent third parties that must themselves have a reputation for
trustworthiness. 62 This is precisely the arrangement that is proposed by
PIFF.
3.

RELATIONAL BASED

Relational trust, also referred to as affective trust' or identity-based
trust,6' develops between trustors and trustees who engage in repeated
interactions and come to rely upon the dependability of party intentions.
Relational trust may offer more stable, long-term interaction even where
some degree of breach has taken place.66 Where trustees make some effort,
such as engaging in PIFF, to signal a restoration of good faith, relational trust
can survive a breach, as long as the breach does not create expectancies that
develop into a reputation for untrustworthiness.6 7

insurance, marketing, and gambling."); Mark J. Machina, Decision-Making in the Presence of Risk, 236
SCIENCE 537, 537 (1987) ("[Expected utility theory has] become the dominant, and indeed, almost
exclusive model of decision-making under risk in economics, operations research, philosophy, and
statistical decision theory."); Paul J. Schoemaker, The Expected Utility Model: Its Variants, Purposes, Evidence
and Limitations, 20 J. ECON. LITERATURE 529, 529 (1982) ("It is no exaggeration to consider expected
utility theory the major paradigm in decision making since the Second World War.").
61

Rousseau, supra note 53, at 399 (citing BERNARD BARBER, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF TRUST

(1983)).
62

"[Ciredible information about the trustee may be provided by others (reputation) or by
certification (e.g., a diploma). Such 'proof sources' signal that the trustee's claims of trustworthiness are
true." Id.
63
Seegenerally Daniel J. McAllister, Affect- and Cognition-BasedTrust as Foundationsfor Interpersonal
Cooperationin Organizations,38 ACAD. OF MGMT.J. 24 (1995).
64

65
66

See generallyJAMES S. COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY (1990).

See Rousseau, supra note 53, at 399.
"Exchanges based on calculus-based trust are likely to be terminated once violation occurs, but
exchanges characterized by relational trust often are more resilient. Unmet expectations can be survived
when relational trust exists, particularlyifparies make an effort to restore a sense ofgoodfaith andfairdealing to their
interactions." Id. at 400 (emphasis added).
67
These expectancies may derive from the calculus-based trust previously discussed. See supra
Part III-A.2.
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4. INSTITUTIONAL BASED
Institutional support at both the organizational level, as in corporate
culture, 68 and the societal level, as in legal systems, 69 can facilitate the
development of both calculus-based and relational trust.70 "Institutional
factors can act as broad supports for the critical mass of trust that sustains
further risk taking and trust behavior. 7 ' A critical consideration in the
determination of the role that institutionalization will play is whether the
institution functions as a control, and therefore becomes largely a deterrent, 2
or as support for trust, and therefore an accelerant for calculus-based and
relational trust.73 This article will later argue for the institutionalization of
PIFF as a means of supporting the generation of trust.7 4
B. What Trust is Not
Trust is a state of mind.75 Trust is not a behavior, but a means to control
behavior. Thus, the concern of this article is not a means of controlling trust
as a choice, per se, but a means of generating trust, in this case PIFF, as an
alternative for guiding behavior; in this case the individual investment in
corporate equities. Further, trust is not independent of other behavior
controlling mechanisms. In fact, it has been demonstrated that legalistic

68
See Brian Allen Warwick, Reinventing the 4heel: Firestoneand the Role of Ethics in the Corporation,
54 ALA. L. REV. 1455, 1468 (2003) (arguing that a conscientious corporate culture "will help prepare a
corporation to act more quickly, and more responsibly..."). But see Robert Prentice, Enron: A Brief
Behavioral Autopsy, 40 AM. BUS. L. J. 417, 436 (2003) (pointing out that inappropriate corporate culture
can have disastrous effects). "Individuals will find it difficult to 'do the right thing when the right thing
is not among the options presented by the institutional processes in which they are participating." Id.
(citing Charles R.P. Pouncy, The RationalRogue: NeoclassicalEconomic Ideology in the Regulation of the Financial
Professional,26 VT. L. REV. 263, 322 (2002)).
69
See generally FUKUYAMA, supra note 3.
70
See Rousseau, supra note 53, at 400.
71
Id. (citine Raniav Gulati. Does Familiarit' Breed Trust? The Implications of Repeated Ties for
ContractualChoice in Alliances, 38 AcAD. OF MGMT. J. 85 (1995); Peter Smith Ring & Andrew H. Van de
Ven, Structuring Cooperative RelationshipsBetween Organizations, 13 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 483 (1992)).
7
"Institutional controls can also undermine trust, particularly where legal mechanisms give rise
to rigidity in responses to conflict and substitute high levels of formalization for more flexible conflict
management." Id. (Citing SIM B. SITKIN & ROBERTJ. BIES, THE LEGALISTIC ORGANIZATION (1994)).

73

Some commentators "see a minimum level of institutional trust as sine qua non for the
emergence of interpersonal trust." Id. at 401.
74
See infra Part VI.
75
"Trust is not a behavior (e.g. cooperation), or a choice (e.g. taking a risk), but an underlying
psychological condition that can cause or result from such actions." Rousseau, supra note 53, at 395.
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controls inhibit the development of trust.76 Finally, trust is not subsumed by
other control mechanisms such as the law.77 It takes more than law and
regulation to constrain the way that people, and the corporations that they
manage, behave. 71 "Legal constraints may increase the probability that one
will perform as promised, but cannot increase one's willingness either to
perform in the absence of constraints or to make oneself vulnerable to the
risk ofnon-performance. ' 9 Rule-based behavior regulation quickly becomes
prohibitively expensive as a product of self-perpetuation. Because rules give
rise to efforts to narrowly comply with the letter of the rule and skillfully

76

Rousseau, supra note 53, at 399.

"[A] detailed legal contract is one mechanism for controlling behavior. However... detailed
contracts can get in the way of creating an effective exchange relationship: in effect, people do
not need to develop trust when their exchange is highly structured and easily monitored.
Although detailed contracts promote limited cooperation based upon deterrence, most firms
that form alliances do so because of a social network of prior alliances, which makes detailed
contracts less necessary."
Id. at 399.
77
See Ide & Yar, supra note 7, at 1120-21.
[Law] cannot eliminate the need for trust. The law's regulatory function is simply inadequate
to ensure trustworthy behavior. First, the costs of enforcement are too great to be able to
police every interaction. Second, too much regulation begets untrustworthiness. One of the
more curious aspects of trust is that trust reinforces trustworthiness and that distrust
undermines trustworthiness. In other words, people are more likely to be trustworthy when
other people trust them, the more external sanctions and restraints on individual discretion
signaling distrust, the less trustworthy the behavior.
Id. See also Sim B. Sitkin & Nancy L. Roth, Explaining the Limited Effectiveness of Legalistic Remedies for
Trust/Distrust,3 ORGANIZATIONAL Sci. 367, 369 (1993).
[A] ttempts to "remedy" trust violations legalistically frequently fail because they paradoxically
reduce the level of trust rather than reproducing trust. The adoption of legalistic "remedies"
(i.e., institutionalized mechanisms that mimic legal forms and exceed legal/regulatory
requirements) imposes a psychological and/or interactional barrier between the two parties that
stimulates an escalating spiral of formality and distance and leads to a need for more rules.
And so the process is perpetuated.
Id. For a thorough treatment of this idea in the context of tax evasion, see Kahan, supra note 8, at 340-44.
Kahan goes on to qualify this view, however, pointing out that laws also serve an expressive function. Id.
at 345 ("Like other types of material incentives, laws have meanings; they are understood to express
societal values and attitudes.").
78
Lessig, supra note 19, at 329 ("[M]ore than law regulates behavior. More than law constrains
how people behave."). For considerations of how social norms contribute to this social regulation without
law, see ERIc A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS

(2000) and ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER

WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991). For the opposite, or contractarian view,

that contractual relationships, existing within the framework of the law and the markets, are what governs
corporations, see Henry N. Butler & Larry E. Ribstein, OptingOut ofFiduciaryDuties:A Response to theAntiContractarians,65 WASH. L. REv. 1 (1990).
79
Larry E. Ribstein, supra note 7, at 562.
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evade the spirit, rules beget more rules."0 Fortunately, trust also begets
trust.81

C. The Importance of Trust
As Alan Greenspan has testified, "our market system depends critically
on trust-trust in the word of our colleagues and trust in the word of those
with whom we do business. 2 There is robust evidence that social capital,
including indicators of trust and civic norms, has significant impact for
economic performance.83 Indeed, there is widespread agreement that "trust
is important in a number of ways: it enables cooperative behavior; promotes
adaptive organizational forms ... reduces harmful conflict; [and] decreases
transaction costs." 84 "Trust is a kind of social glue that allows people to

interact at low transaction costs ... [and] increases social wealth by permitting more investment in production."85 In fact, it has been compellingly
argued that the corporate organizational form depends upon trust for its very

existence. 816 And yet, there is increasing evidence of a loss of trust in the
o

See supra notes 72, 76, 77, and accompanying text.

81

See Frankel, supra note 59, at 322:

[I]fpeople receive "tokens of esteem" that is, signals that they are trusted, they are more likely
to live up to the expectation and become more trustworthy. Conversely, if people receive
signals that they are not trusted, they are likely to become less trustworthy. Thus, trust begets
trust and mistrust begets mistrust.
82
Alan Greenspan has stated that:
[wiell-functioning markets require accurate information to allocate capital and other
resources, and market participants must have confidence that our predominantly voluntary
system of exchange is transparent and fair. Although business transactions are governed by
laws and contracts, if even a modest fraction of those transactions had to be adjudicated, our
courts would be swamped into immobility. Thus, our market system depends critically on
trust-trust in the word of our colleagues and trust in the word of those with whom we do
business. Falsification and fraud are highly destructive to free-market capitalism and, more
broadly, to the underpinnings of our society ....Lawyers, internal and external auditors,
corporate boards, Wall Street security analysts, rating agencies, and large institutional holders
of stock all failed for one reason or another to detect and blow the whistle on those who
breached the level of trust essential to well-functioning markets.
The Federal Reserve Board Website, Testimony of Chairman Alan Greenspan, at
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/hh/2002/july/testimony.htm (last visited March 15, 2005).
83

See Stephen Knack& Philip Keefer, Does Social Capital Havean EconomicPayo? A Cross-Country

Investigation, 112

Q. J.

OF ECON. 1251 (1997) (investigating World Values Surveys administered in 29

market economies).

Rousseau, supra note 53, at 394. See also Galston, supra note 1, at 130-31.
Ribstein, supra note 7, at 553-54.
"Societies in which trust is confined to families (even extended families and kinship systems)
are unable to sustain either the large-scale corporate organizations or the far-flung networks among
84
85
86
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marketplace, a loss of trust in traditional institutions such as the law, and a
loss of trust among individuals.8" Generalization of these expectations
regarding trust and cooperation is the fodder for reputation, an important
recognition of character or trustworthiness, which this article will consider
next.
D. Trust & Reputation
One way that trustees can provide assurance, or a "bond [of] future
performance,"8 8 is the development of a reputation, or a generalized recognition of trustworthiness. 89 Repeated interactions in which trustworthiness is
exhibited increases the value of reputation. 90 Similarly, however, "misconduct diminishes the value of the trustee's reputation according to the
[trustor's] perception of the seriousness of the misconduct." 91 Clearly, then,
a reputation for trustworthiness is extremely valuable and can be determinative in the holder's ability to engage in economic exchange within the

smaller businesses that play such a central role in successful modern economies." Galston, supra note 1,
at 130 (referring to FUKUYAMA, supra note 3).
87
Galston, supra note 1, at 132.
Until recently, Americans have combined an intense mistrust of concentrated power
(including, but not limited to, government) with high levels of trust among their fellow
citizens. The result: a dense network of voluntary associations and a highly successful
economy. But today, Americans have less trust in institutions than they did 30 years ago, and
they are far less trusting ofone another. Evidence collected and recently published by [Robert
Putnam] suggests that our associational life has declined commensurately.
Id. See generally ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN
COMMUNITY (2001).

88

Ribstein, supra note 7. at 569.

89

Id.

90

Ide &Yam, supra note 7, at 1119.
Trust is essential to efficient cooperation. Cooperation allows for the production of benefits
exceeding those achievable by an individual acting alone; however, cooperative behavior by one
individual usually confers benefits to another with the risk that the recipient will fail to
reciprocate. IfA cannot trust B to reciprocate, then either A will not cooperate and will forfeit
the potential benefits or A will expend resources to monitor and control B to ensure B
reciprocates. Alternatively, A can spend resources to punish B for B's failure to reciprocate.
The more A can trust B to reciprocate, the less A must spend to ensure reciprocation or punish
B. One way interpersonal or mutual trust develops between individuals is through repeated
interactions that allow the actors to generalize the expectation of continued cooperative
behavior in subsequent interactions.
Id. In this manner, trust generally, and reputation specifically, can offer tremendous efficiencies in
reduced transaction costs.
91

Ribstein, supra note 7, at 569.
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marketplace. 92 Additionally, a positive reputation can make such exchanges
more efficient, by helping to reduce the burden of transaction costs.93 Where
a corporation faces a loss of reputation, "society may punish the corporation
and require more trust-generating regulation, thereby constraining corporate
discretion." 94

Indeed, reputation is so important to corporations 95 that increasing
attention is being given to the formal management of reputational risk.96 In
what follows, this article will consider alternative responses to social legitimacy crises where reputation loss is possible, 97 beginning with a theoretical

92
See generally Robert Wilson, Reputations in Games and Markets, in GAME-THEORETIC MODELS
OF BARGAINING 27 (Alvin Roth ed., 1985). See also Ide &Yarn, Public Independent Fact-Finding,supra note
7, at 1122.
Faced with greater risks, people prefer to deal with individuals of known reputation even in
the presence of other trust-generating institutions.
This makes a reputation for
trustworthiness extremely valuable for the holder. As uncertainty increases, reputation
becomes an even more important determinate; therefore, it is in a person's interest to manage
their reputation.
Id. at 1123 ("[S]omeone's reputation is valuable to the extent it decreases the risk of trusting."). However,
caution with regard to reputation is always in order. Id. ("[Reputationall information is not necessarily
accurate and could be shaped by the individual's own reputation management efforts.").
93
See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
94
Ide & Yarn, supra note 7, at 1131-32.
95
Id. at 1127-28.
It is in a corporation's enlightened self-interest to be perceived broadly as trustworthy not only
by its transactional stakeholders but by its contextual stakeholders such as government
agencies, media, community groups, and the public at large, which is the on-going source of
future customers, employees, investors, lenders, and vendors. To the extent a corporation
develops a public reputation of trustworthiness, it can function more efficiently.
Id. See also Manto Gotsi & Alan M. Wilson, Corporate Reputation:Seeking a Definition, 6 CORP. COMM. 24
(2001); Oded Shenkar & Ephraim Yuchtman-Yaar, Reputation, Image, and Goodwill: An Interdisciplinary
Approach to OrganizationalStanding, 50 HUM. REL. 1361, 1362 (1997).
96
See generallyJUDY LARKIN, STRATEGIC REPUTATION RISK MANAGEMENT (2003); GRAHAME
DOWLING, CREATING CORPORATE REPUTATIONS (2002); GARY DAVIES ET AL., CORPORATE
REPUTATION AND COMPETITIVENESS (2002); CHARLESJ. FOMBRUN, REPUTATION: REALIZING VALUE
FROM THE CORPORATE IMAGE (1996); David Bernstein, Strategic Reputation Risk Management, 7 J. OF
COMM. MGMT. 275 (2003); Konrad S. Alt, Managing Reputationa! Risk, THE PAA J., Sep. 2002, at 40;
Charles J. Fombrun, Naomi A. Gardberg, & Michael L. Barnett, Opportunity Platforms and Safety Nets:
Corporate Citizenship and Reputational Risk, 105 BUS. & SoC'Y REV. 85 (2000); Jim Kartalia, Reputation at
Risk?, RISK MGMT.,Jul. 2000, at 51, 52 ("In response to evolving concerns, [such as growing anti-business
virulence that poses new strategic risks for all corporations], a new business management concept has
developed-reputation management. Because reputation is the most strategic of assets and thus, at the
greatest risk, reputation management has generated a great deal of interest.").
97
For a consideration ofcorporate apologia as an alternative public response to a social legitimacy
crisis, see Ide &Yarn, supra note 7.
Apologia is not the same as an apology. The latter contains an admission of wrongdoing and
acceptance of responsibility, neither of which are appropriate if the corporation believes the
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model of the relationship between trust and risk, followed by consideration
of the role that trust may play in the management of reputational risk and the
impact that institutionalization98 may have upon this role.
IV. TRUST AND RiSK

Trust and risk are tightly intertwined. 99 In fact, it is because of the
existence of risk that trust finds necessity. 00° Where a transaction is
theoretically risk free, either due to absolute certainty with regard to the
actions of others or perfect control of these actions, trust is not necessary.101
On the other hand, where uncertainty is the source of risk in a transaction,
accusation is unfounded. Corporate apologia may include an apology, particularly if the
corporation acknowledges the wrongdoing, but it isbest defined asa public self-defense by
which the organization responds to criticism by presenting ajustification of its behavior and
through a "compelling, counter account of its actions."
Id. at 1134-35 (citing Keith M. Hearit, Mistakes Were Made: Organizations,Apologia, and Crises of Social
Legitimacy, 46 CoMM. STUD. 1,3 n.24 (1995)). See also Erin Ann O'Hara &Douglas H. Yarn, On Apologia
and Consilience, 77 WASH. L. REv. 1121 (2002); Taryn Fuchs-Burnett, Mass Public CorporateApologia, 57
Disp. RESOL.J. 27 (2002).
98
Rousseau, supra note 53, at 397.
[R]eputation matters, particularly the historical trustworthiness of parties in previous
interactions with others, and it is the social context (e.g. networks) that makes reputational
effects possible. Social norms shape both the behaviors parties engage in, as well as their
beliefs regarding the intentions of others. Institutions promote or constrain trust relations.
Id.
99 See Seligman, supra note 47, at 623 ("Trust is not only a means of negotiating risk, it implies
risk."); Ide &Yarm, supra note 7, at 1118.
Predictability and control may be independent variables influencing the degree of trust
required along a continuum-the greater the risk, the greater potential for trust or distrust.
Trust is not necessary when you can accurately calculate how others will act-the more
accurate the calculation, the less trust required. Nor is it necessary when you can monitor and
control the other's behavior-the more control, the less trust required. It is impossible,
however, to calculate risk with complete certainty or control behavior totally; therefore, some
degree of trust is always required to bridge the gap.
Id.
,00 Rousseau, supra note 53, at 395.
Across disciplines, there is agreement on the conditions that must exist for trust to arise. Risk
is one condition considered essential in psychological, sociological, and economic conceptualizations of trust. Risk is the perceived probability of loss, as interpreted by a decision
maker. The path dependent connection between trust and risk taking arises from a reciprocal
relationship: risk creates an opportunity for trust, which leads to risk taking. Moreover, risk
taking buttresses a sense of trust when the expected behavior materializes. Trust would not
be needed if actions could be undertaken with complete certainty and no risk. Uncertainty
regarding whether the other intends to and will act appropriately is the source of risk.
Id. (citations omitted).
101

Id.

142 UNIVERSITY OFMIAMI BUSINESS LAWREVIEW [Vol. 13:121
trust may serve to mitigate the need to control entirely for such risk, thereby
reducing the burden of transaction costs associated with this control as well
as creating other efficiencies.10 2 Where trust does not exist, individuals and
organizations may be exposed to sources of risk that cannot be costeffectively mitigated by other risk management mechanisms.
One such risk emanates from the strategic importance of reputation and
the organizational consequences that can ensue should a reputation for
trustworthy behavior not be cultivated and nurtured. Where such a
reputation and associated trust does not exist, an organization may find it
difficult to secure interaction with the various stakeholders upon whom they
rely for success. 10 3 The uncertainty surrounding the ability to form these
strategic relationships has been referred to as relational risk."° The form of
relational risk particular to the specific context considered in this article is
one related to shareholder reliance-the consequences of unconstrained risk
are attenuated shareholder reliance, difficulty in the formation of shareholder
relationships, and a resulting inability to accumulate sufficient assets for
long-term organizational success.
This dependence on shareholder reliance can best be illustrated by means
of simplifying models of the trust relationship. This section will begin with
a brief examination of a model of mutual trust, that is, a model in which trust
is extended by both parties to the other simultaneously. Simultaneous trust
models offer insight into the general dynamics of the dyadic relationship and
provide a baseline of comparison for models that better illustrate the trust
relationship between corporate management and shareholders treated
here-sequential trust models. In sequential trust models, trust is extended
in one direction only and both parties are dependent on the cooperative
behavior of the trustor in order to benefit from an interaction or exchange.
A. Simultaneous Trust
The problem of cooperation, or simultaneous trust, can best be represented in a simplifying framework by the famous prisoner'sdilemma. °5 In the
10

103

See supra notes 81, 82 and accompanying text.
See Kartalia,supra note 96, at 51, 52.

Reputation is a broad and far-reaching asset incorporating concepts such as corporate image,
goodwill and brand equity. It is a compilation of views held by all of the firm's stakeholders
-investors, clients, customers, employees, suppliers, partners, vendors, media, financial
analysts, special interest groups, politicians, labor unions, shareholder activists and regulators.
Id.
For an analysis of the effects of trust on relational risk and the formation of strategic alliances,
see Bart Nooteboom et al., supra note 7.
105
See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984). According to Axelrod,
104
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prisoner's dilemma, there are two players, or prisoners, who are interrogated
separately. Each can choose to cooperate with their colleague by not
providing information to the authorities or to defect by incriminating the
other. Each must reach a decision regarding cooperation or defection
independently. As is illustrated in Figure One, if both prisoners cooperate
and provide no information to the authorities, cases against them will be
weak and they will each be sentenced to only one year. Should both
prisoners defect on each other, the cases will be stronger, and they will each
likely face three years ofjail time. However, should one prisoner cooperate
and the other defect, the defector will receive special treatment and no jail
time, and the cooperator will go up the river for five years.
The central observation to be gleaned from this illustration is that should
Player A independently decide to cooperate, he must trust that Player B will
also cooperate. Player B is faced with an unpleasant decision, however.
Should Player A cooperate, it is in Player B's best interest to defect and get
off scot-free. On the other hand, should Player A defect, it is in Player B's
best interest to also defect and avoid a five year sentence. In other words, it
is in Player B's best interest to defect regardlessof what PlayerA may choose to do.
This dilemma is symmetrical, or identical for Player A, and therefore, both
players will defect and lose the benefit of mutual cooperation.06
Player B
Cooperate
Player A

Defect

Cooperate

A = 1, B = 1

A = 5, B = 0

Defect

A=0,B=5

A=3, B=3

FIGURE ONE

The Prisoner's Dilemma

07

"[t]he Prisoner's Dilemma game was invented in about 1950 by Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher, and
formalized by A. W. Tucker shortly thereafter." Id. at 216 n.2.
106
In game theoretical terms, these rational choices are known as the Nash equilibrium. See
HERBERT GINTIS, GAME THEORY EVOLVING 6 (2000) ("A Nash equilibrium in a two-player game is a
pair of strategies, each of which is a best response to the other; i.e., each gives the player using it the
highest possible payoff, given the other player's strategy.").
107
Configuration based upon AXELROD, supra note 105, at 8.
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David Hume wrote that the keeping of a promise is obligated by one's
own interest. 1 8 This assertion is played out quite clearly when the prisoner's
dilemma is iterated. Thus, when two players, prisoners or corporate
management and shareholders, face each other multiple times, they may
proceed in a fragile relationship of trust in order to share the benefits of
mutual cooperation rather than the costs of mutual defection prescribed by
rational choice in a one-time interaction. However, should one player defect,
then trust will be broken and the victim ofthis defection will logically choose
to defect at their next meeting, and future interactions will be stuck in an
equilibrium of mutual defection that is sub-optimal for both players.01 9 For
corporate management that defects on shareholders, the most significant loss
is not that shareholders will no longer rely upon management, but rather that
1
management will no longer be able to rely on shareholders. 0
B. Sequential Trust
This insight can be fine-tuned by structuring a sequential model of trust
that more accurately depicts the relationship between corporate management
and shareholders, which is the focus of this article. In what is known as the
"trust game""' or the "reliance game,' 1 2 Player A must decide whether to
trust or rely upon Player B. Should Player A elect to trust, then Player B
decides whether to fulfill or to exploit this trust. As Figure Two demonstrates, Player A's choice is between forgoing interaction with Player B and
receiving a payoff of 1 with certainty, or trusting Player B to fulfill the
108

DAVID HUME, ATREATISE OF HUMAN NATURE 523 (L.A. Selby-Bigge&P.H. Nidditch eds.,

1978).
109
Part II.

As observed above, this is one reason why trust, once broken, is so hard to regain. See supra

110

See Russell Hardin, Gaming Trust, supra note 51, at 87.

The force that generally backs exchange promises is the loss of credibility that follows from
breaking them. Without credibility, one loses the possibility ofmaking promises. Why should
anyone want the power to make promises? All I really want in my own interest is the power
to receive promises. And there's the rub, because promises are generally part of a reciprocal
exchange. The real penalty here is not that others will no longer rely on me but that they will not let me
rely on them.
Id. (emphasis added).
I
Seegenerally David M. Messick & Roderick M. Kramer, Trust as a Form of Shallow Morality, in
TRUST INSOCIETY, supra note 7, at 93; Toshio Yamagishi, Trust as a Form of Social Intelligence, in TRUST
INSOCIETY, supra note 7, at 143; Robert Gibbons, Trust in Social Structures: Hobbes and Coase Meet Repeated
Games, in TRUST IN SOCIETY, supra note 7, at 335.
112
See generally Geoffrey Brennan, Democratic Trust: A Rational-Choice Theory View, in
BRAITHWAITE, GOVERNANCE, supra note 7.
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extended trust so that they may both receive payoffs of 3. However, after
receiving the trust of Player A, it is in Player B's best interest to exploit this
trust and receive a payoff of 5. By backwards induction, Player A is well
aware of these incentives and will therefore be satisfied with withholding
trust and the resulting payoff of 1 as opposed to exploitation by Player B that
will result in no payoff at all for Player A. Both players end up with suboptimal payoffs.

.0
Nc Trust

Player A
Trust

o

Player I

(A= 1,B = 1)

Exploit

Fulfill

0

0

(A=O,B=5)

(A=3,B=3)

FIGURE TWO
T14E TRUST GAMviE1

3

Similar to the iterated outcome proposed by the simultaneous model,
repeated encounters between two players alter predicted behaviors. Player
B is much more likely to forgo the payoff of 5 and be satisfied with
fulfillment and a payoff of 3 if she faces the prospect of facing Player A again,
at which time Player A can unilaterally decide to withhold trust and limit
Player B to a payoff of 1. The lesson is similar to that taught by the
simultaneous model. "The central problem in the reliance predicament is
...not that there is too much exploitation; the problem is rather that there is too little

113

Configuration based upon id. at 199.
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reliance.,114 This is a crucial point and is therefore worth emphasizing by
application to the current shareholder problem. Investors enjoy the power
of deciding whether to trust a particular corporate management team and to
deploy assets to their care. This is a decision made under significant risk.
After the decision to trust is made, corporate management makes a risk-free 15
choice between fulfilling this trust and accruing some benefit to themselves
and their investors or exploiting this trust and maximizing their own benefit
while leaving investors without.
The consequences of this exploitation are more profound than mere
losses incurred by investors. In future interactions, these investors, and
others whose expectations of trustworthiness have been effected by the news
of the exploitation, will be less likely to make the decision to trust. By
choosing to withhold trust as well as their assets, the investors' payoffs are
negatively affected. In addition, corporate management is burdened with the
consequences of relational risk; unable to attract the assets necessary for the
successful operation of their enterprises, their payoffs suffer. Society as a
whole is significantly harmed.
Responses to the current manifestation of this crisis" 6 have to date largely
addressed the prevention of further exploitation.117 However, models and
arguments presented in this section counsel that the central problem is not
exploitation, but instead a lack of reliance. How might reliance be
promoted? In the context of game theoretic models like those considered
here, a convention of correlated interaction1 18 in which those who cooperate
are more likely to interact with those that cooperate and those that trust are
more likely to interact with those that fulfill has been proposed as a means
of overcoming the trap set by sub-optimal Nash equilibria.11 9 How might
something like this correlated interaction be manifested in a manner that
encourages reliance and provides a means for the management of relational
risk? This article now turns to a brief consideration of relational risk

114

115
116
117

18

Id. at 200. (emphasis added).
Risk-free as compared to the simultaneous model and when limited to a single interaction.
See supra Part II.
See supra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
See BRIAN SKYRMS, EVOLUTION OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 63-79 (1996). Skyrms has

conducted numerous game theoretic simulations in which correlated interaction of players (and it does
not take a great deal of correlation) are easily able to achieve superior results in repeated play. With
regards to learning and reinforcement of correlated behavior, he writes, "We want to endow our agents
with some simple way of learning correlations and of using that knowledge. So we could assume that the
players carry a set of beliefs about what other players will do, and that they modify those beliefs
incrementally in the direction of the observed frequencies." Id. at 71. This is precisely the function that
this article proposes for PIFF.
See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
119
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management in final preparation for the introduction of PIFF as a trust
generating mechanism that would, in fact, encourage reliance.
V. MANAGING RELATIONAL RISK

Relatively recent recognition of the importance of stakeholder reliance
has led to significant efforts to advance knowledge related to corporate
reputations, their management, measurement, and valuation. 120 Investment
in reputation building efforts, however, is not the only means for controlling
relational risk. There are other trust generating mechanisms that can be
considered, as well as more direct measures that transfer stakeholder risk to
the corporation or to third parties.
In short, corporate management can manage their own relational risk by
doing everything feasible121 to mitigate the risk borne byvarious stakeholders.
Stakeholder risk may be managed directly by means of warranties and
guarantees, other contracts, and the often costly compliance with regulation,
including audits and other monitoring devices. In addition, however, a key
insight that follows from the previous discussion of the relationship between
trust and risk122 is that management can also deal with relational risk by
23
investing in reputation building and other trust generating mechanisms.'

120

See generally David A. Whetten & Alison Mackey, A Social Actor Conception of Organizational

Identity and Its Implicationsfor the Study of OrganizationalReputation, 41 BUS. & SOc's 393 (2002); Beth
Coming, GreatReputations, 123 ACCOUNTANCY38 (1999); Joseph A. Petricket al., GlobalLeadershipSkills
and Reputational Capital:Intangible Resourcesfor SustainableCompetitive Advantage, 13 THE ACAD. OF MGMT.
EXECUTIVE 58 (1999); Joseph Asher, PromotingBrandIdentity: What's Your NameAgain?, 89 ABA BANKING
J. 78 (1997); William L. Benoit, Damage Repair Discourseand Crisis Communication, 23 PUB. REL. REV. 177
(1997); Daniel B. Turban & Daniel W. Greening, Corporate Social Performance and Organizational
Attractiveness to Prospective Employees, 40 ACAD. OF MGMT.J. 658 (1997). For some recent attempts at the
measurement of reputation, see Steven L. Wartick, MeasuringCorporateReputation: Definition and Data, 41
BUS. & SOc' 371 (2002); Leslie Gaines-Ross, Leveraging CorporateEquity, 1 CORP. REPUTATION REV. 51
(1998). For an excellent collection of resources, see the Reputation Institute's website at http://
www.reputationinstitute.com.
121
Feasibility here is intended to be economic feasibility. Of course, there will come a point at
which marginal gains resulting from the ability to attract stakeholder interactions will be exceeded by
marginal costs associated with the mitigation of stakeholder risk. Clearly, engaging in every possible
means of mitigation is not what this article proposes.
122

See supra Part IV.

123

Ide & Yam, supra note 7, at 1125-26.

Transactional stakeholders are composed of internal and external cooperating constituents.
Internal constituents include directors, managers, employees, and shareholders. External
constituents include lenders, vendors, suppliers, and customers.... Lenders and suppliers
expose[] themselves to uncollectible loans. Customers risk either never receiving or receiving
substandard products and services. Trust among their internal constituents and external
cooperators is necessary for corporate efficiency.
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Such tactics do not shift stakeholder risk to other bearers, such as insurers,
but rather provide a means to offset stakeholder risk by counterbalancing
effects on subjective decision-making. These ideas may be formalized in the
following simple way:
Let
R, be the relational risk of a given corporate concern,
R, be the aggregate risk borne by shareholders, and
T be trust generated by various trust generating mechanisms.
Then
R C =R s .
T
Thus, of course, corporate relational risk, Re, can be managed by direct

mitigation of the risk for the shareholders associated with the interaction,
shareholder risk can also be attenuated by
R,,' 24 but the effect of remaining
25
T.1
trust,
of
the promotion
Up to this point, this article has argued that the loss of trust associated
with the collapse of Enron and other recent corporate debacles is different
from previous corporate crises, both in its breadth and magnitude. 126 As
such, traditional legal responses and regulatory tightening may not be sufficient to return to long-term market stability. 127 In fact, using well-known
models in game theory, this article has demonstrated that focus should be
placed on the encouragement of reliance rather than further attempts at
monitoring and the prevention of exploitation. 128 The consequences of these
insights for the management of relational risk have been explored and a

Id. Ide and Yarn cast a wide net that hints at the generalizability of application that the insights offered
by this article may offer, but particular focus is directed here at a particular group of stakeholders-the
shareholders.
124
To be precise, shareholder risk will emanate from various sources, and many means to control
such risk will be fraught with various levels of subjective uncertainty. Shareholder risk could therefore
be written as an expectancy, R s = RB - CP, where RB is a theoretical baseline risk, C i are risk reductions associated with particular mechanisms, (warranties, guarantees, audits, etc.), and Pi are levels of
confidence or subjective certainty with regard to effectiveness.
125
Similarly, trust may emanate from various sources and the targets for these trust generating
mechanisms will hold varying degrees of confidence in each source. Trust could therefore be written as
an expectancy, T =Y tiPi, where 1i,are the theoretical objective trust levels emanating from particular
sources, (reputation, interpersonal relationships, PIFF), and P, are levels of confidence placed in each
source.
126
See supra Part II.
127
See supra notes 44, 77-78 and accompanying text.
128
See supra Part IV.A-B.
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simplifying model that describes two means of accomplishing these tasks has
been offered. 129 This article will now decidedly narrow its focus, leaving
behind the methods for direct mitigation of stakeholder risk that constitute
typical responses to corporate crisis, 130 the R. term in the model just
described, and turn its attention to a novel trust generating institution that
finds its home in the denominator of the second segment of the model, the
T term.
VI. PUBLIC INDEPENDENT FACT-FINDING AS A
TRUST GENERATING INSTITUTION

Trust and reputation may interact in a manner that allows trust to be
placed in an individual, corporate entity, or institution because one "trust[s]
the source of the reputation which could either be [another] trusted
individual, [another who has engaged the target of the trust], or a trusted
institution, [such as] a bar referral service."' 31 That is to say that the source
for trust that this article advocates as a component of relational risk
management may be trust in the reputation of another individual or
institution. This section explores PIFF, one mechanism built around such
external sources. Beginning with an overview of fact finding generally, this
section then examines the importance of independence and of procedures for
the public dissemination of findings. Next, some briefcase histories of PIFF
in action are presented. This section concludes with a discussion of the
importance of institutionalization for the future of PIFF.
A. Fact Finding Generally
Fact finding as an element of dispute resolution is certainly not a new
idea. 132 Indeed, one stock in trade of any legal practice is competent,
objective fact finding, even when representation will ultimately be conducted
as an advocate. This article, however, focuses on an extrajudicial use of fact
finding in which a form of public, self-critical analysis,' 33 conducted by
129
130

See supra Part V.
See supra Part II. and supra note 124 with accompanying text.

131

Ide & Yarn, supra note 7, at 1125 ("[W]e trust because .. our previous experience confirms

the object's trustworthiness[] and trust-generating institutions, including those that mediate reputation,
reduce the risk of trusting. In the latter case, the object of our trust includes the trust-generating
institutions themselves.").
132
Fact-finding is a "process ofdetermining the facts relevant to the controversy and, as such, [is]
a crucial aspect of most dispute resolution Processes." DICTIONARY OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION 178
(Douglas Yam ed., 1999).
133 Ide & Yarn, supra note 7, at 1141. "Major organizations in severe legitimacy crises sometimes
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independent investigators, serves to bolster public trust, mitigate stakeholder
risk, and thereby make important contributions to corporate management of
reputational and relational risk. The process generally involves retaining a
high-profile public figure, often a retired governmental official or a
prominent lawyer, who carries out an independent investigation of a
controversy, allegation, or other organizational problem and prepares a report
that is made publicly available to various stakeholders. The importance of
fact finder independence and public dissemination of investigation results
cannot be overemphasized.

...engag[e]

eminent persons as independent fact finders. We believe this development is a promising
trust generating process in the current environment of distrust." Id. Ide and Yarn detail two types of factfinding: (1) as a form of alternative dispute resolution (ADR), and (2) as a self-critical analysis or internal
investigation. They describe fact-finding as a form of ADR as an "ad hoc and voluntary process" where
the results of the investigation are "typically for the parties' use only" and are therefore rarely made public.
Id. at 1142-1143. Fact-finding as self-critical analysis is employed "unilaterally simply to determine the
facts of a situation and to respond to or correct it accordingly. In the private sector, a corporation might
unilaterally engage a fact finder to investigate a complaint or problem internal to the organization." Id.
at 1144. As Ide and Yarn warn, these self-critical analyses are often conducted internally "by selected
board members or committees, internal staff, ombudsmen, general counsel, outside counsel, or
accountancies and which is implicitly encouraged by emerging legal trends." Id. at 1144-45, n. 141, 142
(citing Michael P. Kenny & William R. Mitchelson, Corporate Benefits of Properly Conducted Internal
Investigations, 11 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 657, 658 (1995))
("[M]ore and more corporations in one form or another are utilizing internal investigations
to investigate potential wrongdoing by employees, including, in some instances, senior management.");
Gregory J. Wallance, Internal Investigations and Document Destruction Policies After Enron, in CORPORATE
COMPLIANCE, at 639 (PLI Corp. Practice Course Handbook Series No. 1218, 2002) (providing a list of
questions counsel should ask itself as they perform internal investigations or oversee document
destruction); Raymond C. Marshall, ConductingInternal Investigations--What to Do and Not to Do, A.L.I.A.B.A., Nov. 8, 2001, at 25 (suggesting efficient/effective method for conducting internal investigations);
Joseph McLaughlin &J. Kevin McCarthy, CorporateInternalInvestigations--LegalPrivileges andEthical Issues
in the Employment Law Context, A.L.I.-A.B.A.,July 23, 1998, at 991 (examining work-product doctrine and
attorney-client privilege when attorneys perform internal investigations); Joel W. Sternman & Emily
Eiselman, Advising the Directors: Minimizing the Risk of Litigation Through Internal Investigations by Special
Counsel, A.L.I.-A.B.A., May 28, 1992, reprinted in THE PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF SHAREHOLDER
LITIGATION AGAINST DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS (1992); Harvey L. Pitt & Karl A. Groskaufmanis, When
Bad Things Happen to Good Companies: A Crisis Management Primer, 15 CARDOzO L. REv. 951, 961 n.55
(1994) (noting the effect on the sentencing guidelines multiplier); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 8C2.5(t) (1994); Charles J. Walsh & Alissa Pyrich, CorporateCompliance Programsas a Defense
to CriminalLiability: Can a Corporation Save Its Soul?, 47 RUTGERS L. REv. 605, 607-08 (1995) (proposing
that an effective compliance program be a defense to corporate criminal liability, not just a mitigating
factor); Dan K. Webb et al., Understandingand Avoiding Corporateand Executive CriminalLiability, 49 BUS.
LAW. 617, 657-59 (1994) (explaining that the implemented compliance program must be effective in
preventing and detecting criminal conduct). The effectiveness of self-critical analysis in the mitigation
of relational risk "depends on the thoroughness of the investigation, the accuracy of the report, and the
perceived validity of the process by the affected corporate constituents." Id. at1145.
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B. The Importance of Independence
Clearly, independent fact finding will not assuage concerns that various
stakeholders may have about a given crisis, and the objective of mitigating
relational risk will not be achieved, unless the investigation is perceived as
independent from internal control and other conflicts of interest. 134 There
are a number of important implications related to this requirement. The fact
finder should be given complete control over the process and broad access
to both information and resources. Additionally, obvious conflicts of interest
arise when management is afforded the opportunity of selecting the fact
finder without some sort of institutional oversight. Even more importantly,
"a fact finder cannot be independent if the corporation or any of its
135
constituents are capable of terminating the engagement at any time."
C. PublicDissemination
While it is evident that independent findings must be made public in
order to instill the trust that is the objective of the PIFF process, this
requirement for publicness extends to more than just substantive results.
"For PIFF to function successfully as a trust-generating mechanism, both the
process and the person conducting it must obtain the public trust." 136 For
this reason, the independence of the process and the fact finder, in addition
1 37
to the results of the investigation, must be made publicly clear.
D. PIFFin Action
While the use of PIFF as a means of restoring public trust is a growing
trend, it is not entirely new and there are a few examples of cases in which
corporate management has relied upon PIFF as a means of addressing a
crisis. 138 Two such cases are briefly considered below.
134

Ide & Yam, supra note 7, at 1146.

135

Id.
Id. at 1153 n.182. "Fair procedures promote trust in the decisionmaker and acceptance of the

136

outcome, not because they achieve a more advantageous outcome, but instead because people evaluate
the outcome through a 'fairness heuristic' that judges the outcome based on perceived aspects of
procedural fairness in how the decision was reached." Id. (citing E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE (1988)).

137 Id. at 1153 ("If the public is relying upon the report, all indices of independence must be public
and must withstand public scrutiny.").
138
In fact, in the aftermath of the Enron crisis, Arthur Andersen, Enron's auditing firm hired
former SenatorJohn Danforth, with the Saint Louis law firm of Bryan Cave, and former Federal Reserve
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1. E. F. HUTTON
In what may have been the naissance of the use of PIFF during the
management of corporate crisis, 139 the Wall Street giant E. F. Hutton hired
Atlanta lawyer and former Attorney General Griffin Bell to investigate an
internal check-kiting scheme that came to light in the mid 1980s.14° In an
effort to stem the ominous tide of public opinion that threatened the firm's
continued existence, Hutton hoped that Bell would "determine the cause,...
identify who in the company should be held accountable for the scheme, and
...recommend [improved] control measures."' 41 The product of the
investigation was the so-called "Hutton Report," 142 which recommended
discipline for numerous Hutton employees. Hutton ultimately merged with
Shearson and Lehman Brothers.143

2. NrKE
Another household name, Nike, faced crisis when accusations were
144
lodged against the company related to allegedly exploitative labor practices.
In fact, Nike had led its industry in the development of guidelines for labor
relations, both internally and among its suppliers, with the creation of the

Nike Code of Conduct. 45 Nonetheless, "reports of sweatshop conditions

Chairman Paul Volcker to conduct an independent investigation following accusations that they had
destroyed documents relevant to Enron's accounting practices. See David Hilzewrath, Data Destruction
Intensifies Andersen's Woes, WASH. POST, Jan. 11, 2002, at E01, available at 2002 WL 2520305; David
Hilzewrath &Jackie Spines, Andersen Recasting Its Image; Volcker to Lead Reform Effort, WASH. POST, Feb. 4,
2002, at Al,availableat 2002 WL 10945793. Some commentators have characterized Andersen's "narrowly
defined engagement of Danforth and Volcker" as "too little, too late." Ide & Yarn, supra note 7, at 1151.
139
Ide & Yarn, supra note 7, at 1147.
140
See Tom Ferris, Was Guilty Plea UnnecessaryEvil? In Wake of Bell Report's Findings,E.F. Hutton's
Answer May Be Yes, AM. BANKER, Sep. 6, 1985, at 1; Sarah Bartlett, The Fall of the House ofHutton, BuS.
WK., Dec. 21, 1987, at 98; Barbara Rudolph, E.F.Hutton's Simmering Scandal; More and More QuestionsAre
RaisedAbout the Investment Firm, TIME, Jul. 22, 1985, at 53, available at 1985 WL 2367489; Irwin Ross, Inside
the Hutton Debacle, Fortune, Aug. 28, 1989, at 127.
Ide & Yarn, supra note 7, at 1148.
141
See Pearce v. E.F. Hutton Group, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 810, 812 (D.D.C. 1987).
142
Shearson Reportedly Reaches Pact To Buy E.F. Hutton, JOURNAL RECOISD, Dec. 3, 1987, at 1,
143
availableat 1987 WL 4342040.
144
Brad Knickerbocker, Nike FightsFull Court Presson LaborIssue,CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Sep.
23, 1997, available at 1997 WL 2804148.
145
See Nike Website, Workers & Factories: Code of Conduct (Jan. 2004), at
http://www.nike.com/nikebiz/nikebiz.jhtml?page=25&cat=code (last visited Nov. 12,2004).
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146
and substandard wages precipitated a corporate social legitimacy crisis.
Nike hired former U.N. ambassador Andrew Young147 to conduct an
independent investigation of the allegations. Young's very public report.4 8
made recommendations for enhancement and more effective application of
the Code of Conduct-recommendations that contributed, according to
some, to the dissipation of the crisis.149

E. Institutionalization
As the high profile cases and the associated high profile investigators
considered above illustrate, it is critical to the success of PIFF that
corporations that employ the tactic are perceived as genuinely concerned
about getting to the truth rather than as merely trying to bask in the glow of
the halos associated with famous public figures."50 As this article has
previously argued,15 ' a high level of transparency, with regards to both fact
finders and process is required in order to achieve the public perceptions of
independence and publicness required in order for PIFF to generate trust.
One approach that has been proposed to accomplish this transparency is an

Ide & Yarn, supra note 7, at 1149.
Matthew Quinn, Young to Study Nike Policies on Sweatshops, ATLANTAJ. & CONST., Feb. 25,
1997, at Cl.
148
See Andrew Young, Andrew Young's Report, at http://www.calbaptist.edu/dskubik/young.htm
146
147

(last visited Nov. 12, 2004).
149
Ide & Yarn, supra note 7, at 1151.

("Young's PIFF cannot be credited directly for Nike's
continued success-however, in spite of some criticism ofYoung's efforts, accusations of exploitive labor
practices have largely dissipated."). But see Tina Cassidy, Can'tJust Do It Anymore; Nike's Recent Success
Turns Spotlight on Firm-ForBetteror Worse, BOSTON GLOBE, Jun. 28, 1997, at F1 (quoting human rights
group Global Exchange's president as saying that Nike "bought off Andrew Young.").
150
Ide & Yarn, supra note 7, at 1154-55. Ide and Yam also warn that "corporations that abuse the
process and public figures who merely sell their reputation to 'whitewash' socially irresponsible
corporations" may undermine the promise of the PIFF process. Id. at 1154 (citing Dana Canedy, Checking
What's UnderNike's Heel, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 25, 1997, at D1; Liza Kaufman, CredibilityforHire? Griffin Bell,
Tappedfor Implant Probe, Draws Fire, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 24, 1992, at 1; Blessed by Paul: Paul Volcker and
Other CorporateCleanup Men, SLATE, Feb. 4, 2002 (noting that Arthur Andersen hired former Federal
Reserve Board Chairman, Paul Volcker, Jr., to monitor the company's accounting practices, and quoting
Volcker as saying, "The reason I got involved is that Andersen is in big trouble and they were looking for
someone to sprinkle holy water on them."), at http://slate.msn.com/?id=2061633 (last visited Dec. 19,
2003); David Plotz, FormerSen. John Danforth: Why is "St.Jack" HelpingArthur Andersen?, SLATE, Jan. 18,
2002 (describing the engagement as one in which "Andersen basks in the reflected glory of St. Jack" and
asserting that "Andersen approached Danforth because they know he will give the company a nice
scrubbing. Andersen wants Danforth to make dozens of recommendations for document handling, and
then to walk away, leaving the world with the impression that St. Jack has given Andersen a gold stamp."),
at http://slate.msn.com/?id=2060848 (last visited Dec. 19, 2003)).
1Si
See supra Part VI.B.-C.
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institutionalizationof standard procedures and best practices that would make
PIFF less vulnerable to the variation that individual fact finders bring to the
process. 52 Institutions may advance trust relationships. 1 3 Consideration of
how such an approach may be pursued is well informed by a study of the
PIFF institutionalization efforts of one well-known provider of alternative
dispute resolution services-the American Arbitration Association (AAA).
VII. AAA INDEPENDENT FACT FINDING
The AAA is a very large, diversified provider of dispute resolution
services with over 800 employees, 35 offices, and more than 8,000 arbitrators
and mediators worldwide." 4 With more than 75 years of history in the field,
the AAA has administered more than 2 million cases.'
In response to the
epidemic of corporate crises witnessed in the early part of the new century,' 56
the AAA announced in 2002157 "an entirely new service-AAA Independent
Fact-Finding Services [IFFS]-that [would] provide [] an impartial, objective
investigation in emerging crisis situations."5 8 The AAA sought to leverage
its reputation for integrity and impartiality to address the very need for new
trust generating mechanisms that has been described in this article.5 9 The

152

Institutionalization refers to "the extent to which there are well-known, regularized, readily

available mechanisms, techniques or procedures for dealing with a problem." Richard E. Miller & Austin
Sarat, Grievances, Claims,and Disputes:Assessing theAdversary Culture, 15 L. & Soc'YREV. 525,563 (1980-81);
Ide & Yam, supra note 7, at 1156.
It includes, but is not limited to, the following: policies, laws, procedures, and practices
embedded in social and organizational systems and culture of society to integrate conflict
prevention and resolution in an organization, the process by which conflict prevention and
resolution become part of the organizational identity, and absorption, adoption, or melding
of conflict prevention or resolution activities into an organization or policy.
Id. at 1156 n.189.
153
Rousseau,supra note 53, at 393 (citing FuKUYAMA,supra note3);JamesM. Hagen& Soonkyoo

Choe, Trust inJapaneseInterfirmRelations: InstitutionalSanctions Matter,23 AcAD. OF MGMT. REv. 589(1998).
154
American Arbitration Association, AAA - Arbitration, Mediation and Other Forms of Altemative
Dispute Resolution (ADR) - FastFacts,at http://www.adr.org/index2.l .jsp?JSPssid= 16235 (last visited Nov.
17,2004).
iSS
American Arbitration Association, AAA - Arbitration, Mediation and Other Forms of Altemative
Dispute Resolution (ADR) - FastFacts,at http://www.adr.org/index2.1.jsp?JSPssid= 16235 (last visited Nov.
17, 2004).
1%
See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
157
Press Release, American Arbitration Association, AAA Announces Launch of New Independent Fact-Finding Services and Panel; Independent Investigation for Organizations Facing Crisis (June
4, 2002) [hereinafter AAA Press Release], reprintedin BUS. WIREJune 4, Westlaw.
158
Promotional Brochure from American Arbitration Association, AAA Draft Promotional
Brochure (on file with author) [hereinafter AAA Promotional Brochure].
159

Id.
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AAA hoped that this reputation, together with uniform standards and a panel
of high profile public figures, would help to counter the "growing public
perception that traditional responses to a developing crisis-investigation by
internal resources or existing
outside counsel-[lacked] the objectivity
160
credibility.
to
essential
Overall, the AAA did an excellent job of designing IFFS policies and
procedures to address the fundamental requirements of independence 6 ' and
publicness 62 that are so critical for PIFF to be successful in generating public
trust. To ensure independence, a prospective client is required to make the
initial contact with the AAA rather than any candidate fact finder. 163 The
AAA independently vets a list of potential fact finders, ensuring that conflicts
of interest will not threaten the independence of the process." Only then
does the client have the opportunity to select an acceptable fact finder from
a list of three candidates.' 6' The fact finder maintains complete control over
the investigation, but must limit their activities to those congruent with
independence. 166 The role of advocate is explicitly forbidden. 67 Should a
client attempt to discontinue an IFFS engagement prematurely or in some
other way obstruct the fact finder's efforts, the fact finder is contractually
permitted to terminate the engagement and make publicly available a report
describing why such termination was necessary. 168 Finally, the IFFS policies
and procedures meet each of the requirements for publicness.169 Policies,
procedural guidelines, and rosters of fact finders are, or will be, all publicly
available in their entirety on the AAA website and in promotional materials.
Results and conclusions of investigations "must be disclosed to an

Operating under the Association's [AAA] imprimatur of integrity and impartiality, AAA
Independent Fact-Finding Services offer a unique degree ofcredibility. Fact-finders are drawn
from a prominent panel of nationally recognized and experienced lawyers. Their mission is
not one of advocacy, but of independent investigation conducted according to the highest
ethical standards. Their report or conclusion-because of their arms-length independencecan be a major factor in preserving public trust and confidence during a potential crisis.
Id.

162

AAA Promotional Brochure, supra note 158.
See supra Part VI.B.
See supra VI.C.

163

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, AAA IFFS POLICIES AND PROCEDURES 2.1, 2.3

160
161

(May 30, 2002) [hereinafter IFFS POLICIES & PROCEDURES] (draft on file with author).
164
Id. at 2.1, 5.2.
165
166

Id.
at 5.
Id. at 7.3 ("The Fact-Finder shall not act as an advocate for the Client but shall instead conduct

an independent investigation and shall control all aspects of the investigation.").
167
Id.
16s
Id. at 8.1-8.4.
169
See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
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independent committee of the board of directors or trustees, the public, a
court, or some other appropriate independent body approved by the AAA." 7 0
The AAA's IFFS is still taking shape and has yet to become what would be
considered a going concern. Institutionalization can be a slow process.
Whether the AAA's offerings will be accepted by the public and by
corporations seeking to restore public trust remains to be seen.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS

Trust, or the decision to make oneself vulnerable based on positive
expectations of the intentions of others in order to achieve long-term joint
benefit, has been a factor in human interaction for many thousands of
years.17 1 In fact, this is supported by the existence of a brain that, as a product
of evolution, has developed a finely tuned capacity to recognize human faces
and employ a framework of mental accounting that allows humans to trust
some individuals and distrust others in highly context sensitive circumstances. 172
This article has proposed a way that corporate concerns may capitalize on
this feature of human nature to make their organizations more viable and
their social exchanges more efficient. By making themselves more vulnerable, corporations can reduce the risk for investors and other stakeholders to
interact with the corporation, thereby mitigating the corporation's reputational or relational risk. The need for new trust generating mechanisms has
arisen from a profound loss of trust characterized by a rash of corporate
crises, exemplified by the Enron debacle, 173 that have brought into question
the viability of the safeguards that have long been thought of as adequate
protection for shareholder interests.
As Alan Greenspan testified,
170

171

Ide &Yarn, supra note 7, at 1159 (citing IFFS POLICIES & PROCEDURES, supra note 163, at 7.5).
See FRANS DE WAAL, GOOD NATURED: THE ORIGINS OF RIGHT AND WRONG IN HUMAN

AND OTHER ANIMALS (1996); CHRISTOPHER BOEHM, HIERARCHY IN THE FOREST: THE EVOLUTION

OF EGALITARIAN BEHAVIOR (1999). In fact, these ideas have recently been developed in Francis
Fukuyama's most recent book, The Great Disruption:Hunan Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order.
See Quddus,supra note 3, at 94 (citing FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE GREAT DISRUPTION: HUMAN NATURE
AND THE RECONSTITUTION OF SOCIAL ORDER (1999)).

In The GreatDisruption, [Fukuyama] takes his ideas from Trust to a deeper level of analysis, by
attempting to explain the natural mechanisms by which social capital is developed. Fukuyama posits that
human evolution has developed in a way that encourages a person to serve his own self-interest by
following social norms. He explains that over thousands of years the human species has evolved ways to
recognize cheaters. Id. See generally THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (Oxford University Press 1998).
172

TRUST& RECIPROCITY: INTERDISCIPLINARYLESSONS FROM EXPERIMENTAL RESEARCH,supra

note 7, at 7.
173
See supra Part II.
174
Id.
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"[l]awyers, internal and external auditors, corporate boards, Wall Street
security analysts, rating agencies, and large institutional holders of stock all
failed for one reason or another to detect and blow the whistle on those who
breached the level of trust essential to well-functioning markets." 7 5 These
stunning failures "[have] caused a profound loss of trust by investors,
financial institutions and the general public ....
Furthermore, traditional legal responses to corporate crises may be
incapable of addressing the problem.' 77 New laws and regulations may have
the unexpected effect of "diluting the practical importance of corporate codes
by increasing the costs and risks of self-policing.' ' 7 8 It can, in fact, be
perilous to believe that any amount of new regulation will have the effect of
preventing corruption. 7 9 This article has proposed a typology with some
alternatives to purely deterrence-based forms of trust. 8 ' Trust of these
different types can help to optimize
market organization, reduce transaction
181
costs, and promote social welfare.
This article has demonstrated that trust and risk are inextricably
intertwined;' 82 that, in fact, trust is only necessary in the presence of risk. 83
Employing game theoretic models of trust relationships, this article has
shown that response to the loss in trust should focus not on the prevention
of further exploitation, as traditional responses do, but rather on the
promotion of stakeholder reliance." 8 Drawing attention to trust generating
mechanisms, such as relational risk management alternatives to direct
mitigation, this article has presented a simplified model that formalizes some
185
of the ideas that have motivated this research.

See supra note 82.
BIXBY, supra note 13, at 2 (emphasis added).
177
See supra Part III.B.
178
The Good, the Bad, supra note 11, at 2141 (citing Letter from William N. Shepherd, Richman
GreerWeil Brumbaugh Mirabito & Christensen, P.A., tojonathan G. Katz, Secretary, U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission, http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/s74002/wnsheapardl.htm).
179
Id. Laws can become counterproductive because "when [companies are] over-regulated, [they]
begin to gear the system to comply with the regulations in such a way that [they are] adhering to the letter
of the law but the actual spirit of it has totally evaporated." Id. (citing Jeffrey L. Seglin, Will More Rules
Yield Better Corporate Behavior?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 17, 2002, S 3, at 4 (quoting comments of Jeffrey E.
Garten, Dean of the Yale School of Management)).
180
See supra Part III. The alternatives include calculus-based, relational-based, and institutionalbased trust.
181
See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
182
See supra Part IV.
1a3 See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
184
See supra notes 110, 114, and accompanying text.
185
See supra Part V.
175
176
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Finally, this article has examined PIFF as a means for generating public
trust, promoting stakeholder reliance, and managing relational risk. 1 6 PIFF
avoids the sanction-like characteristics of deterrent-based measures 87 while
offering information from reputable third parties that informs the subjective
probabilities of the calculus-based typology 188 and signaling the restoration
of good faith that can maintain relational trust, even in the face of a breach." 9
Early attempts at institutionalization, such as the AAA's IFFS, are designed
to be supportive of calculus-based and relational trust rather than as another
control that would function merely as a deterrent. 190
Critics may object that information technology has fundamentally
changed the dynamics of economic exchange 191 in such a manner as to
reduce the importance of trust. These arguments have been rejected on
empirical grounds.' 92 In fact, in a world characterized by increasing ease of
interaction, but interaction among strangers, 93 trust may be even more
important. Even with the rise of contractual relationships, legal and
regulatory responses have been overwhelmed by the sheer magnitude of

186

187

188
189
190
191

See supra Part VI.
See supra notes 56, 57, and accompanying text.
See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 66-67, and accompanying text.
See supra Part VII.
See Galston, supra note 1, at 131.

It has become fashionable to claim that changes in modes of production and in information
technology have nullified the utility of the economies of scale characteristic of the Industrial
Age. Smaller, more independent entrepreneurial units, perhaps even the home and familybase production characteristic of the preindustrial era, will supposedly now predominate. If
so, the non-family trust needed for larger economic organizations might well prove to be of
diminishing significance. But [this argument can be rejected] on empirical grounds.
Economies of scale continue to dominate the most rapidly growing sectors of the Information
Age. And, in those cases where large corporations are replaced by extensive networks of
smaller units, trust is not less, but more, necessary for successful performance.
Id.
192
193

Id.
For an attribution of changing trust dynamics to modernity, see Seligman, supra note 47, at

621-22:
Traditional societies organized around kinship bonds were societies with very high levels of
prediction, hence high levels of confidence based on a combination of familiarity and
sanctions .... The system of obligations, responsibilities and mutuality.., is clear and visible
and hence confidence in behavior is remarkably high .... Modernity, if not urbanity is of
course precisely the opposite of this. It is life among strangers, among those one does not
know and those who do not know you.... Unable to assume familiarity ...and rooted in a
"system" of much greater cognitive liability than one based on kinship we nevertheless enter
into myriad of interactions with others on the basis of something akin to trust.
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94
and trust has remained largely a product of voluntary
economic exchange,'
95
1
association.
We would do well to be reminded that "every economic activity is also
a social activity." 196 In the end, it all comes down to people.' 9 As
RepresentativeJackson-Lee reminded her colleagues in 2002, "the insistence
on corporate ethics does not diminish the importance of the ethics of
individuals and institutions."' 98 It could be that markets of self-interested
individuals may be more effective' 99 than increased regulation at turning the
tide of corporate governance and managerial ethics. 200 Trust begets the

See also Elias L. Khalil, Trust, in THE ELGAR COMPANION TO INSTITUTIONAL AND
EVOLUTIONARY EcONOMICS 340 (Geoffrey M. Hodgson et al. eds., 1994).
First, as economic exchange becomes less intermingled with kinship and more based on formal
contractual relationships, the monitoring conducted by the kin members and the threat of
ostracism almost vanish. Second, the modernjudicial system, which replaces the threat system
of ostracism and shunning, cannot practically monitor the extensive growth of contractual
agreements-even the explicit ones.
Id.
195
See Galston, supra note 1, at 130.
194

Trust ... rests on a set of ethical habits and reciprocal moral obligations internalized by
members of a community. It is the expectation that arises within that community of regular
and honest behavior based on shared norms, such as truth-telling, good intentions, reciprocity,
and competence. The seedbeds of these virtues are neither economic nor political institutions
but, rather, the voluntary associations of civil society, starting with (but extending beyond) the
family.
Id. (referring to FUKUYAMA, supra note 3).
1%
Quddus, supra note 3, at 95.
197
See The Good, the Bad, supra note 11, at 2123 ("[A] corporate code of behavior is only as good
as the directors and officers responsible for implementing it.").
198
148 Cong. Rec. H5472-73 (daily ed. July 25, 2002). Rep. Jackson-Lee continued, "It has
become common practice for corporations to prepare an ethics code for the guidance of their officers and
employees. However, one corporate C.E.O. has argued that this is simply an empty gesture. . . 'those
corporations with a sound moral base do not need it and for the others it is just a fig leaf.'" Id.
199
Wallison, supra note 24 ("The decentralized, somewhat chaotic US financial markets have a
self-correcting element that is powerful, pervasive and generally underestimated.").
2Wo As Kenneth Lay, the chairman ofEnron, learned the hard way, markets can cut both ways. See
The Amazing DisintegratingFinn, supra note 21, http://www.economist.com/business/PrinterFriendly.cfm?
StoryID=896844.
Mr. Lay had always described himself as "passionate about markets". That fervent belief in the
invisible hand led him to spot one of the most powerful trends of the past decade: the
deregulation of commodity markets. He would often forge ahead fearlessly into newly
deregulating markets, bully recalcitrant regulators into speeding reforms and develop clever
financial vehicles that pressed to the very edge of the law. In the end, though, Enron appears
to have overstepped the mark. The resultant backlash comes as a bitter reminder that the
market forces that Mr. Lay once worshipped can prove a double-edged sword.
Id., http://www.economist.com/business/PrinterFriendly.cfm?StorylD=896844
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willingness to take risks that drives the markets forward.20 ' PIFF provides a
way of generating this trust, relying upon a market for reputation rather than
more of the legal and regulatory interventions that have once again been
proven ineffective. Adam Smith would be proud.

201

See BERNSTEIN, supra note 3, at 8.

The word "risk" derives from the early Italian risicare, which means "to dare." In this sense,
risk is a choice rather than a fate. The actions we dare to take, which depend on how free we
are to make choices, are what the story of risk is all about. And that story helps define what
it means to be a human being.

